



**MARINE CORPS
GAZETTE**



Marine Corps Gazette

JUNE 1951

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Opinions expressed in the Marine Corps GAZETTE do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Navy Department nor that of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.

THIS MONTH'S COVER: Engineers probe for mines ahead of a Marine tank-infantry column advancing against the Reds on the Central Korean front. **BACK COVER:** A native bridge becomes a field expedient in crossing a Korean stream as Marines of the 1st Marine Division move to new position.

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MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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THIS MONTH AND NEXT—Every Marine should turn to Page 30 of this issue and begin reading another notable chapter in Marine Corps history. Beginning this month is the first of a series of official accounts of the undeclared war in Korea in which Marines have served in keeping with highest traditions of the Corps.

This month the Pusan perimeter action starts the series. Next month official accounts of the Inchon landing will appear in the GAZETTE. These articles are being prepared by the Historical Division, U. S. Marine Corps exclusively for the GAZETTE.

Also scheduled for the July issue are several thought-provoking and interesting articles. In his article, *Pegasus*, LtCol R. E. Collier would go the ancient Greeks and their flying horse one better with his idea for a new reconnaissance vehicle for commanders that would replace the jeep.

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Message Center

Military Television . . .

DEAR SIR:

In his article, *Take TV Out Of The Bar—And Put It To Work*, Maj R. E. Collier mentions the Marine Corps conducting TV tests almost five years ago with inconclusive results.

Lack of funds and, even after the Major's fine article, lack of interest may still exist as reasons for not having military television. But television equipment, ideal for amphibious operations, certainly does exist.

The particular equipment I have in mind was developed almost a year ago for industrial use. And, for those interested, full details of the radically new camera tube, camera, and monitor unit were published in the May and June 1950 issues of *Electronics* magazine.

If my memory is correct, the dimensions of the camera were three by five by eight inches, the size of a large cigar box. Lens from 16mm motion picture cameras were used. This means that lens, all the way from close-up to telephoto, are economically and readily available as these are quite common today. The main reason this particular camera is so "big" is because the manufacturer installed a motor inside for remote control of lens focus.

Although a larger camera tube would have afforded greater definition in the final picture, the small one-inch diameter tube employed resolved over 350 lines per linear inch. This would probably be good enough for ground work. A larger tube could be used if finer definition is required for aerial photos. Since the size of the tube's mosaic is the only determining factor in a "Vidicon," doubling its area would double the resolution.

These "Vidicon" tubes achieve sensitivity surpassing the human eye, so lighting is not a problem. The output of such

tubes is also extremely high compared to studio television equipment, which is the main reason for compactness. Far less amplifiers are required in both the camera and the monitor. Because of high signal levels, vibration of parts has much less tendency to affect the picture. Thus, low power consumption, and the fact that the combined weight of the camera and its monitor is under 100 pounds, means that almost any carrier could be employed, including helicopters and jeeps. The price? The manufacturers estimated that the entire unit would retail for about \$6,000.

Someone is undoubtedly going to ask about the expense of training personnel to operate and maintain the equipment in the field. Any man who can tell if a picture is focused could operate such a camera without special instruction. And, as a man who used to teach television camera equipment in general, I claim any radar technician or repairman could be trained to efficiently maintain these simple circuits in two or three weeks time.

Maj Collier said, "It is not beyond the realm of possibility that sound photographic cameras could record television transmissions for purposes of critique of training operations. . ." This is quite true as television networks today are receiving some of their shows in such manner.

Various industries in this country have taken TV out of the bar and have put it to work. But again, the question Maj Collier presented, "When do we get it?"

ROBERT T. LAKEBRINK,
Sgt, USMCR

And St. David . . .


DEAR SIR:

Charles Graves' fine article, *And St. David—Comrades in Arms*, in the March issue of the GAZETTE, brings back treasured memories of comradeship with members of the Royal Welch Fusiliers near whom I had the honor to serve while stationed in Tokyo.

Marines, and for that matter, any good soldier, can be proud to have a history of friendship with the Fusiliers. The men I knew had served throughout the last year of World War II in Europe and in the China-Burma-India Theater. After the war most of the men in the organization served in the rotten and thankless tour in Palestine, in the post-war Indian riots, and in the early jungle fighting in Malaya.

When I met them, in the winter of 1946-47, the RWF was in Tokyo as part of the British Commonwealth special guard

Each month the GAZETTE pays five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients, and what have you. Correspondents are asked to keep their communications limited to 200 words or less. Signatures will be withheld if requested; however, the GAZETTE requires that the name and address of the sender accompany the letter as an evidence of good faith.




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detail at the Imperial Palace. Virtually all of these men hadn't seen their beloved "Blighty" for nearly four years and had no prospects of returning home for at least another year or two. Yet in the time I knew them, I heard not one single word of complaint or bitterness. This in spite of the fact that they had a daily program of training that made the average GI's scalp crawl and in spite of the fact that their permanent occupation base was on the island of Shikoku, as dull and monotonous a place as could be found.

Shortly after I left for home, the Fusiliers were sent back to the jungles of Malaya.

On the basis of my own contact with the regiment, I can add a hearty "amen" to Mr Graves' words of praise. Any Marine who comes in contact with the RWF, and who takes the time to overcome the inherent British reserve toward strangers, will be well rewarded, for he will receive that which only a kindred spirit has to give.

WILLIAM V. KENNEDY,
Ex-Cpl, USAF

Eighteen Year Olds . . .

DEAR SIR:

I have been reading with considerable interest the opinions of our national leaders in regard to the drafting of or making it mandatory for the 18 year olds to serve in the Armed Forces.

It is my opinion that a youth of 17 or 18 who is still in his formative years provides the best basic material for a first class fighting force. Having recently left school, his mind is receptive and quick to grasp the many military subjects and "know how" which must be taught to him in a limited period of time. His physical condition, endurance and reflexes are at a high level.

The old adage "you can't teach an old dog new tricks" should exemplify the difficult task the military instructor faces when trying to teach the older man or guide his thoughts in accepted military fashion. It is an accepted fact that an athlete, in most cases, starts to slip after age 25. The same certainly applies to the physical condition of most civilians who are called upon to fight.

The minds of most youths of 17 or 18 do not follow regular channels or patterns of thinking, thereby making it much easier, more or less, to mold or influence their thinking through intensive instruction and proper example in order to qualify them mentally as first class fighting men. The teen-ager's thinking has largely been influenced at home by his parents or in school by his teachers. The military merely takes over.

The mature man has been accustomed to doing his own thinking with very little or no influence from other sources. Overnight, we of the military are faced with the difficult problem of influencing his thinking or doing it for him.

The proper team spirit which is so necessary for an efficient fighting unit can usually be easily developed in the youngster. His recent participation in one of the competitive school sports, where fine spirit is almost always in evidence, makes him

highly adaptable in acquiring spirit or attitude toward his unit.

To develop the same spirit in a man in his late twenties is a task of the first order. In most cases, all of his daily functions have been as an individual. Consequently he is lacking in spirit or team attitude.

Years ago it was the opinion of some military leaders that a broke soldier was the good soldier. Today I think the youth of 17 or 18 years of age with little or no responsibility at home is the good soldier.

In civilian life after age 25, most men have acquired some responsibility in one form or another. Naturally these responsibilities will understandably divert their full attention from the military, during their period of service.

If I were a company commander and were permitted to organize my unit with age groups as I saw fit, my selections would be as follows: Non-rated and junior noncommissioned officers from 17 to 24, with special emphasis placed on securing troops of 17 to 21; senior noncommissioned officers from 25 to 35; platoon leaders from 23 to 28; and the age of the company commander between 28 and 32. Exceptions in the ages of the senior noncommissioned officers, platoon leaders, or company commander would only be made in the cases of professional soldiers whose abilities were known.

ANTHONY J. COCCO,
MSGT, USMC

Lending Library . . .

DEAR SIR:

After reading the *100 Best Books* article in the February GAZETTE, the following thought occurred to me:

Has anyone ever suggested the formation of a Marine Corps lending library, from which military personnel from all over the world, and in any status, could borrow books, possibly paying an annual membership fee, and mailing costs for all books borrowed?

Undoubtedly there are many servicemen, both regulars and reserves, active or inactive, who would like to read a great many more military books than they can afford to buy, so this type of organization could fill a definite need. Perhaps it would be better to have this facility as a joint-service function, catering to Army, Navy, and Air Force as well, since our interests overlap considerably.

Possibly this has been done. If such an organization exists, please advise who to contact for further information.

GEORGE DALE,
1stLt, USMCR

Ed: We have no information on any such organization.

Kernels and Colonels . . .

DEAR SIR:

Lt Blyth in his article *On Cultivating Kernels and Colonels* (March GAZETTE) suggests that a policy be established "whereby a happy medium between seniority and ability be the basis for promotion." I feel that the author should have



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Today—even as Chance Vought's tightly-knit team prepares for quantity production of its newest jet fighter, the "Cutlass"—additional orders have been received for the latest model of the battle-proved Corsair.

The scrapper that wouldn't be scrapped is a flying testimonial to the soundness and thoroughness of Chance Vought engineering, which—in close cooperation with the Navy—has produced top-flight aircraft for the U. S. Navy since 1919.

Chance Vought Aircraft DALLAS, TEXAS

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reminded his readers that the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 makes provisions for accelerated promotions of outstanding officers by permitting a selection board to recommend for promotion officers on the eligible list junior to the promotion zone not to exceed five per cent of the total number that the board is authorized to recommend for promotion.

While such provisions, even if exercised more frequently by selection boards, are probably too conservative for Lt Blyth, who feels that "the present system of promotion impedes initiative and stagnates those with superior capabilities," it is preferred to any "point" system or other inflexible device for selecting the Eisenhowers, the Vandegrifts, and the Halseys of tomorrow.

S. D. MANDEVILLE, JR.,
LtCol, USMC

ALL GONE

The 1950 bound volumes of the Marine Corps GAZETTE are no longer available through the GAZETTE Bookshop. The last of these volumes was sold on 26 April, and orders received after that date will be returned.

A few loose copies of each issue during 1950 are available, including the big 175th Anniversary Issue. These will be sold at the regular price per issue to persons wanting to prepare their own bound volumes.

The GAZETTE has a very limited supply of bound volumes for the years 1948 and 1949 containing good reference material. These will be sold at half price (\$2.50 per volume) until the supply is exhausted.

C-O-L-D . . .

DEAR SIR:

The immediate reaction upon reading the four rules (in C-O-L-D, March GAZETTE) proposed as governing the wearing of clothes by Marines who are fighting where sub-zero temperatures are common, was to propose a fifth rule: "Be certain that the enemy is not engaged in combat." For certainly once the enemy is encountered the difficulty in keeping clothes clean, keeping them dry, and at the same time avoiding overheating presents a task that is virtually impossible. The advice proposed in the GAZETTE feature C-O-L-D smacks of the same unrealistic reaction evoked in some quarters when quite a few frostbite cases were incurred by Marines fighting in the Chosin Reservoir area in Korea. At the time recommendations were made that disciplinary action be taken because it was contended that the majority of the frostbite cases were due to carelessness. Such comments as, "Well, why didn't they change their socks?" were common. Nothing could have been further from the truth! All Marines in the 1st Marine Division were quite adequately clothed and equipped (with the possible exception of the shoe pac) to fight in the terrain and temperatures encountered. What many persons were prone to overlook was the

simple fact that in combat it is not always possible for the rifleman to sit down and change his socks. Unfortunately the enemy may be present.

This may seem to be a minute point and quibbling on a small scale but one expects realism to be found in the professional magazine of the United States Marines. All too often ideas or suggestions are expressed as principles when as a matter of truth the factor of combat has not been considered. All training in the Marine Corps has as its ultimate aim the development of a "trained for combat" product. Clothing, equipment, and the use of such should have the same aim.

MARTIN J. SEXTON,
Capt, USMC

ED: The subject matter contained in the GAZETTE's short feature C-O-L-D, including the four basic rules (keep clothing clean, avoid overheating, use the layer principle, and keep clothes dry), came directly from the pages of current Marine Corps and Army manuals on arctic training. The GAZETTE realistically understands that optimum conditions seldom prevail in combat situations.

Error . . .

DEAR SIR:

Having been originally responsible for snatching Cpl Norval Packwood away from the Parris Island Boot, I have watched with vicarious pride the steady improvement of his drawings and designs. Without question, the securing of his services was the most valuable if not the only contribution I made to the GAZETTE during my tenure. However, I would caution Cpl Packwood again as I cautioned him when he first reported to the magazine: Everything that appears in the GAZETTE should be technically accurate if nothing else.

My complaint? Look at the lead illustration for *Easy Alley*, pages 14-15, May issue. The drawing shows a Browning LMG spitting out empty cartridge cases at a terrific rate from the top of the receiver. Check your *Guidebook for Marines* or other manuals, Cpl Packwood, and you'll see that the LMG's ejection port is underneath. The empties don't fly off anywhere—they just pile up on the deck.

Of course, if I wanted to be snide, I could say that the editors, presumably being more experienced in infantry weapons, should have noted this error before the engraver got to work.

HOUSTON STIFF,
LtCol, USMC

ED: To use a baseball expression, you caught us off first base. The editors were so enthralled with the artistic beauty of this illustration that we forgot to check for finer details. Incidentally, it is Sgt Packwood now.

Bookshop . . .

DEAR SIR:

First I would like to congratulate you on your excellent magazine, the GAZETTE. I am not a Marine, as yet, but I enjoy reading the GAZETTE. I sincerely believe that reading the



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
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GAZETTE gives me a greater appreciation and understanding for my country. It helps me a lot in my American History class, so much so that my teacher finally had to ask me where I got my information on Marines, and the American wars. I am glad to tell you that my buddies think a lot of your GAZETTE too.

Sir, in the back of most of the GAZETTES is a list of different books. Are civilians allowed to purchase these books, or are these books sold only to those in the armed forces?

ELMER BEATTY,
Racine, Wisc.

ED: The GAZETTE Bookshop's services are available to civilians as well as members of the Armed Forces. Only members of the Marine Corps Association, however, are given the privilege of purchasing books at a discount.

Proficiency Marks . . .

DEAR SIR:

The letter written by Capt Gordon G. Black, appearing in the May 1951 GAZETTE appears to be the *only inconsistency* in assignment of marks for proficiency.

Marks for proficiency are assigned in accordance with Paragraph 11207 of the Marine Corps Manual and not in accordance with the instructions appearing on the reverse side of NAVMC 118(4)-PD.

After the present enlisted service record had been in use for a short time, Headquarters Marine Corps became aware of the inequities contained in the instructions for assignment of marks for proficiency, and in August, 1950, Paragraph 11207 was changed by Advance Change Letter No. 1 to Change No. 3.

Further, all marks for proficiency assigned reservists while members of a reserve unit prior to being called to active duty will be disregarded when the service record is closed for discharge in accordance with Marine Corps Memorandum 13-51, dated 14 February 1951.

It appears that Capt Black does not have access to an up-to-date Marine Corps Manual and Marine Corps memoranda.

LIONEL J. GELINAS,
CWO, USMC

Three Up and Nine Back . . .

DEAR SIR:

Maj Ed Simmons in his *Three Up—None Back* (May GAZETTE) spotlights a vital and multi-faceted problem. The problem, he says, is to increase the proportion of fighting troops to headquarters and service troops and to provide the commander with an organization allowing more tactical combinations than does the triangular or by-threes set-up. His solution is to give the battalion four rifle companies. He supports this proposal quite adequately.

It may be of interest to your readers that Liddell Hart, the eminent British military critic, also has developed this idea at length in his recent book *Defense of the West*. In addition to increasing the cutting edge and allowing more tactical combi-

MISSIONS... and *MIRACLES!*



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U.S. Marines Watch In Awe As Big Bridge Floats Down

World's First Air Dropped Bridge Spans Carried By 119's To Chosin Reservoir Battle

HQS, FEAF CARCOM, (A.T.)
The world's first air drop of a bridge was made today by aircraft of the FEAF's Combat Cargo Command, was eight spans totaling 16 tons were parachuted near Kotori-Ri in North Korea.

United States Marines, fighting bitterly against hordes of Chinese Communist Troops in the frozen north, gazed up in awe as the huge C-119 "Flying Boxcars" of the 314th Combat Cargo Wing broke through an overcast and spilled out the huge pieces of equipment. Large 100 foot parachutes supported the spans as they drifted slowly down, landing near the determined leathernecks.

Mission successful, pilots returning to this lift base, started

These Col. A office Evacu Air D of the by the cal that large since Comb estab remain ber o airlif lity in highly of th Since in Kor ed ri Nation woun casual Korea ed by enemy ed and flight. caring swelled recent in a for ing th 30 Sep ber

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nations, Liddell Hart seeks to eliminate links in the chain of command. At present the excess number of links causes delay in transmitting orders and information and weakens the higher commander's power by making him more remote from the cutting edge and diminishing his direct influence on front line events. He also seeks to increase the power of maneuver by superior organizational flexibility.

To this end he advocates organization by fives (nobody yet has offered to dub this a "pentagonal" organization). Try to figure out for yourself the number of tactical formations possible with five units. The regiment and corps echelons are eliminated with a consequent saving in overhead. An army would have five divisions. Each division would have five battalions of five rifle companies each. Liddell Hart cites a number of examples to support his thesis. One ridiculous example of useless multiplication of headquarters units was Montgomery's 21st Army Group, virtually organized by twos. It had armies of two and three corps respectively, and corps operated two or three divisions, sometimes even one. Things were little different in the American Army. On the other hand, Clausewitz concluded that eight to 10 units were the proper number for a higher commander to control and four or five for a lower commander with a smaller staff. Napoleon, in his early and most successful campaigns, operated with four to six divisions. Later, when he introduced a corps link, he was less effective. In his 1918 victories, Haig operated with five armies while the outstanding Australian Corps handled from five to seven divisions. In World War II, Russian commanders handled five or six armies of seven or eight divisions each with no corps echelon. Certain British and German divisions operated at a reduced strength of six battalions and their commanders considered they held a marked advantage in maneuverability. Finally, the British infantry battalion has four rifle companies and operates quite successfully.

Within a division, the saving in overhead can be demonstrated easily. Organized by fives, the division has 25 rifle companies.

Four battalions and three regimental headquarters and service units are eliminated with a great saving in numbers and in time required to execute the division commander's will. It might be argued that with five units the span of control is too great for effective operation. However, it has been done successfully before as shown above and with modern communications it should be even more feasible. Some may hold that the division commander doesn't have enough to do in handling three regiments and for this reason often commands battalions directly as was frequently done in World War II. This may not be the real reason, however. Perhaps the division commander felt a need for the greater maneuverability achieved by directly controlling more than three units.

That this may be a purely academic discussion as far as the Marine Corps is concerned is readily realized. After the somewhat mixed memories of the erstwhile "J" series T/O, any

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thing remotely similar might be rejected automatically. The "J" T/O gave the division up to six separate infantry battalions and was designed presumably to economize on regimental overhead during a period of stringent peacetime economy and to achieve certain flexibility for the performance of diverse post-war missions. These goals were achieved. If my memory serves me correctly, however, at no time were as many as five battalions concentrated in one division for training and maneuvers to see if any advantages in tactical flexibility and maneuverability accrued. Everyone at once became concerned over jury rigging RCT staffs from division headquarters and interposing them in the chain of command in order that amphibious exercises could be conducted according to the book. Finding this rather difficult they condemned the "J" T/O. There may have been other things wrong with the "J" T/O but they are not pertinent to this discussion.

The Marine Corps has long led the profession of arms with valuable tactical and organizational innovations in addition to its development of amphibious operations. A few of these are: dive bombing, close air support, air supply of troops, tactical use of helicopters, tank-infantry teamwork, the fire team, trebling the automatic weapons fire power in the infantry and the antitank-assault platoon. The Marine Corps also leads the nation's armed services in economy of force—that is, greater combat power per dollar spent and men recruited. Stated differently this means a higher proportion of fighting men to the men in headquarters and service units. Never an outfit to rest on its well earned laurels, the Marine Corps, in its constant effort towards greater combat power and efficiency while keeping rear echelon troops to a minimum, would do well to consider seriously Maj Simmons' proposals.

F. B. NIHART,
LtCol, USMC

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"Badges" . . .

DEAR SIR:

On 12 March 1951, the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Cavalry Division physically and officially tied in their left and right flanks respectively when a unit from Able Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines contacted Love Company, 5th Cavalry Regiment, on Hill 703, southwest of Hongchon, Korea.

While the foregoing statement of fact may not seem to be

of world-shaking importance, my fellow Marines and I came across two incidents which provoked much discussion among all hands in the company on our return, and these discussions, both pro and con, have increased in vehemence since that moment.


The first occurred at 0900, when we met a unit from the 3rd Australian Battalion of the 27th British Brigade, which was in the process of being relieved by the aforementioned Love Company. After much handshaking and mutual admiration of the cigar I happened to be smoking (which the Aussies thought I had received in some wonderful PX ration), three Aussie lieutenants expressed heartwarming sentiments as to the fighting abilities of, as they called us, "our friends from Montezuma." Then, as they got the word to move back off the high ground, the three of them turned simultaneously to me for a souvenir of what seemed to them, and to me, I must admit, quite an historic occasion. "Do you have a badge, Lieutenant?" After 20 seconds of highpower brainbusting, I suddenly realized they wanted a "1stDivvy" patch such as they had encountered in the late Pacific war. Naturally I couldn't give them one, because, at the present time, we of the 1st Marine Division do not rate or carry patches. Thus, a wonderful opportunity for spreading international good will and stories about their meeting frontline troops of the Marine Corps was lost forever by we Marines who, unlike our UN brothers, including all the U. S. Army units, could not give away souvenirs of this great division of ours because we no longer rate them!

"Why don't we rate the 1st Divvy patch now, Lieutenant?" was the first question asked by 2dLt J. A. Nichols and myself as soon as our highly esteemed Australian friends had left. The answer? "I don't know, lads. Maybe HQMC will authorize it again pretty soon." What else could I say? On our return to the rest of the company, the question had spread like one of the pine forest fires our WP shells start here on a windy day.

The second incident occurred within 30 minutes when we climbed Hill 703 with Love Company and its executive officer and met Capt Cook, the company commander, who had just finished his reconnaissance and was preparing to send a patrol over to contact the 1st Marine Division. These highly touted fighting men also were in a patch-trading mood. As a result, I have one of the most famous patches in the Korean theater, that with the black horse's head on a gold field, among my Korean souvenirs. In addition to this, the company commander and some of his older sergeant first class platoon sergeants wore on their combat jackets the world-famed Combat Infantryman's Badge, the symbol which signifies to all the fighting forces of the UN that the wearer has served in a combat infantry unit against his country's enemies.

Again, on our leaving this famous organization, a rugged BAR-man quizzed Lt Nichols and myself with, "Why don't we get a badge like that, Lieutenant?" While I puzzled over a logical answer, this Marine plied us with more questions. "I

NOTICE



Plaque presented by people of Maui as token of friendship.

The Fourth Marine Division Association has recently announced that its Fourth Annual Reunion will be held this year as planned, at the Hotel Sherman, Chicago, Ill., June 28, 29, and 30. For details, write: Fourth Marine Division Association, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington 25, D.C.

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- (1) North Korean aggression, period 27 June through 2 November 1950.
- (2) Communist China aggression, period 3 November 1950 through unannounced date.
- (3) Inchon landing, period 13 September through 17 September 1950.

know that all Marines are basically infantrymen, and my big brother told me that was the reason he didn't get one in the last war, but, dammit, Marine pilots and ex-paratroopers can wear badges showing their specialties, yet a runner 15 miles back of us in Division will wear the Korean Service Ribbon with just as many stars as we will, and I'll be—damned if it seems fair to me!"

My answer? What answer is there to a statement like that? Yes, yes, I know that one Marine is a BAR-men on a front-line unit and another a runner back in Division because they both were assigned to those jobs and thus it is equally important that each does his utmost to perform his duties as well as he knows how. But, and let em emphasize this *but*, the pilot and the paratrooper, like the Army's combat infantryman, do not get their badge because they are chosen people who are so rare that they possess extraordinary skills (because any pilot or jump artist will tell you that the average Marine could be

taught to perform their duties efficiently). They are, in actuality, recognition of the fact that these men perform duties which are normally much more hazardous than those of their brothers-in-arms! Then this bold fact stares us in the face: granted, that an airplane out of gas while in flight is exceedingly more difficult to debark from than a tank in a similar condition, and more ex-paratroopers have medical records featuring tales of multi-broken arms, legs, and ankles than do gravelcrunchers, but, by percentage, who has more Purple Hearts than the hardcharging agents who carry and fight the BARs, M-1s, MGs, and mortars in frontline Marine units?

Yet, when these same Marines go back to Uncle Sugar Able, what does the average troopie have to show for playing again the percentages? Why can't the fastmoving PFC have a symbol to show how he actually met the enemy face to face with nothing between him and death and glory but his beloved rifle?

Maybe I'm wrong in my own facts or beliefs, but these are the thoughts of the Marine now charging over the ungodly hills of Korea, pursuing the enemy as far as the UN wishes and allows, and he thinks, and so do I, that if he is fortunate enough to do his job well and still survive, that he, the man who is actually meeting the enemy at close quarters, in person *and not by hearsay*, should be allowed to wear some symbol that would signify to the folks back home that he was the highest of all fighting men since the art of war was born, a fighting, frontline Marine!!!

WILLIAM J. DAVIS,
1stLt, USMC

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Artillery Support For The Brigade In Korea

By LtCol Ransom M. Wood



✿ WHEN THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLES' ARMY launched its attack against the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950, there was in training in Camp Joseph H. Pendleton, among other units and organizations, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. This artillery battalion was, without a doubt, at the peak of perfection, insofar as readiness for combat is concerned. It was this battalion that had the honor of supporting the 5th Marines, and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, during its offensive operations in and around much of the so-called Pusan Perimeter in South Korea in August and early September 1950. The manner in which the battalion, and indeed the Brigade, met the conditions which rose to face it, from the time the Brigade landed in Pusan, Korea, on 2 August until it was absorbed by the 1st Marine Division on 15

September, proves beyond doubt that the training engaged in at Camp Pendleton was thorough, adequate, and realistic.

During the combat period in the southern part of Korea in those early days of the war, the battalion was composed of three four-gun batteries and essential elements of Headquarters and Service Batteries. Before we left Camp Pendleton the battalion received sufficient numbers of personnel to bring us up to about 20 per cent over the number allowed by the K Tables of Organization, Peacetime. This cushion, so to speak, was invaluable, as we learned of the enemy's tactics of infiltration, since these men were used primarily in a local security role.


Immediately upon arrival in Pusan we began to unload and prepared for a combined motor-rail movement to an assembly area in the vicinity of Changwon, a small village approximately 20 miles to the rear of the then front lines near Chindong-ni. Three days were spent in this assembly area while we assembled our gear, shook our sea legs, and became accustomed to the "delightful" odor which is characteristic of Korea. During these three days

A graduate of Alabama Polytechnic Institute, LtCol Wood entered the Marine Corps in 1938. He commanded the artillery battalion about which he writes from 6 July to 22 November 1950. He was awarded the Legion of Merit for operations in South Korea and the Bronze Star for operations in the Inchon-Seoul area.

my executive officer and I called on the Commanding General, Division Artillery, 25th Division, BrigGen G. B. Barth, USA. I was anxious to learn as much as possible about the fighting in Korea, particularly as it affected artillery. Gen Barth was certainly one of the best qualified sources of such information, for he was the first general officer of the U. S. Army to arrive in Korea after American troops were sent to the aid of the ROK Army. Having commanded troops of the 24th Division in their retrograde operations from an area north of Taejon to the Pusan perimeter, he had learned much about the enemy and his tactics. He gladly passed the information on to us, and I know that accepting his advice and applying his suggestions contributed to the efficiency of the battalion during its later encounters with the enemy. Also, the Brigade was under the operational control of the 25th Division during its first operation; consequently, my artillery battalion was under the operational control of the division artillery commander.

On 6 August 1950, the Brigade moved into Chindong-ni (a picture of the village appears on the cover of the October 1950 GAZETTE), preparatory to relieving the 27th Regimental Combat Team. After the relief, the Brigade, in conjunction with the 5th Regimental Combat Team (Army), were to advance on and capture the towns of Sachon and Chinju, respectively. The 1st Battalion, 11th, relieved the 8th Field Artillery Battalion in position and registered before the 8th F.A. closed station. Unfortunately, the lack of available position areas necessitated our moving into the same position area occupied

BELOW: Marine patrol passes through the village of Chindong-ni, where the author's battalion first went into position. It was here that the 1st Bn, 11th Marines lost a gun and gun crew to accurate enemy fire.



by the battalion we relieved. This position area was partly in the center of the town of Chindong-ni, while the remainder was on the outskirts of the town. This was an undesirable position because the North Koreans had our position plotted even before we moved in. That night, with extremely accurate counterbattery fire from a high velocity weapon (from a T-34 tank, we believe), we had our baptism of fire which resulted in the loss of one howitzer and all of the gun crew. Had we displaced to an alternate position area to the rear, we would not have been able to support the 5th Marines. The terrain was such that there just were no alternate position areas available at that time. So, we had to dig in and stick it out as best we could. After two days and nights of intermittent shelling in that position area, every man in the battalion was convinced of the value and necessity of digging foxholes, gunpits, and ammunition pits.


On the following day, as preparations were made to commence the attack and advance on Sachon, some 30 road miles away, the Brigade and the 5th RCT found



themselves "cut off" as some newspaper correspondents were wont to say. Actually, the Reds had, during the night, moved some men around the flank and had occupied a high hill which overlooked the MSR leading into Chindong-ni from Masan. It was necessary to destroy these troops and to occupy the vital terrain feature ourselves prior to commencing the attack on Sachon. In the course of the fighting which ensued for the next two days, in temperatures ranging up to 112° F., the battalion more often than not had one battery laid on an azimuth generally South, one battery on an azimuth generally West, and the third battery laid North. In the many position areas the battalion occupied, in South as well as North Korea, we found that to fully support the infantry regiment, areas must be selected and the position so organized as to permit at least one battery to fire in any direction. I think that this is one of the important lessons we learned in fighting infiltrating troops — artillery must be able and always prepared to fire in any direction on a moment's notice. This naturally means additional work in preparing additional trail and ammunition pits.

On 10 August, when the attack on Sachon got under way, we displaced about five miles toward the objective

on our first move. We were glad to get out of the village of Chindong-ni. It was filthy, stinking, and bad luck. Just prior to displacing, we received 50 South Korean policemen who were to be used in military tasks. We were under strict orders not to use them as laborers. So, we used them to augment our local security Marines. These policemen had U. S. carbines, but they knew little about the proper use and care of them. These men were dressed in bright green uniforms, they wore rubber shoes similar to our rain "rubbers," and they had very little personal gear. We had to feed, furnish uniforms for, and equip, as necessary, these policemen. Additionally, as we had time, we had to train them in marksmanship, sanitation, ammunition handling, and how to eat our food. (They ate native rice when we could get it.) After about a week on our food, these South Koreans were as big chow hounds as any Marine in the battalion. Their services as local security were invaluable; however, it was difficult to impress on them the necessity for bringing in prisoners rather than killing the Reds. They had an intense hatred for the Communist soldiers. The problem of educating the policemen in the proper method of handling the prisoners was finally accomplished, for be-



fore the operations in the Inchon-Seoul area were over, the handling of large numbers of prisoners captured by the batteries was one of our major headaches.

From 11 August to 14 August, in temperatures still above 100° F., the battalion displaced as required to support the infantry in its advance. It was during this advance that we realized the necessity of violating one of the principles in the employment of artillery. This concerned the distance the artillery should be behind the infantry during an attack. Whereas it is considered good practice to displace to within 2000-3000 yards of the front lines when the front lines have extended to from 6000-8000 yards from the position, at times we advanced to within 500-1500 yards of the front. This we did, well knowing the risks involved of being within enemy mortar range most of the time, because we did not want the distance to grow too great between us and the infantry, and thus give the North Koreans an opportunity to pass wide around the infantry flank and surround our position area.

An interesting shoot occurred late in the afternoon of 12 August while we were on the outskirts of Kosong. We were adjusting our fire on a crossroad between Kosong

and Sachon, around which an enemy motorized force, estimated as a regiment, was camouflaged in the various native houses nearby. After we fired a few rounds the Reds, no doubt assuming that we knew of their position and were about to work it over, attempted to move westward over the road leading to Sachon. We fired on the column until we ran out of range. Immediately after we ceased firing an air strike was called. The next day as we advanced over the same road we noted that few of the estimated 70 vehicles of the column escaped destruction. It was here that we captured our first Russian-made "Jeeps."

On the morning of 14 August and when within sight of our objective, Sachon, the Brigade was ordered to return to the vicinity of Chindong-ni. Soon after arrival in that area again, we were ordered to proceed via rail and motor march to Miryang, some 90 road miles distant. The rail head was in Masan, 15 miles away, and the weather was the worst it had been since our arrival. It was raining heavily and the wind blew hard and cold. As the battalion convoy passed through Masan it stopped long enough to drop off at the railroad station there all personnel except drivers, gun crews, and essential fire direction and communication personnel. I wanted as many men as possible to be as comfortable as possible, and I thought that by putting the maximum number on the trains, I would achieve my goal in this matter. It is a moot point to say which group of men, the train riders or the truck riders, was the more uncomfortable. It is definite that neither group was comfortable. The train trip, counting stops for goodness only knows what reasons, at every village along the route, took some 17 hours; the motor march, over unfamiliar, narrow, winding, alpine roads took almost as long. Consequently, we arrived in Miryang, during the wee hours of the morning, in no condition to appreciate, then, the rest area in a beautiful grove of trees along a river.

We spent two days in the "rest area," washing clothes, guns, trucks, ourselves, and eating, for the first and only time in Korea, fresh meat and eggs. (Most of the time in South Korea we were on the move so much of the time that we were unable to get or handle, if we could get, fresh provisions.) During the "rest" period Gen Craig and his staff were completing arrangements for the next offensive the Brigade was to initiate. The coming action concerned the reduction of an enemy reentrant on the east side of the Nakdong River, just west of Yongsan. During the planning and action which followed, the Brigade was under the operational control of the 24th Division.

The enemy occupied an area approximately 5000 yards by 5000 yards on our side of the river, and he had the capability of increasing the size of his force and the amount of equipment within the reentrant. Yongsan was

his immediate objective. After that, he planned to capture Miryang. The capture of Yongsan would have been a serious threat to the United Nations position, for capture of this road junction town would give the enemy easy access to Miryang. His possession of Miryang, only 25 miles away, would have made Taegu, the keystone to the United Nations defense perimeter and the provisional capital of the Republic of Korea, untenable, since both rail and motor roads from Pusan to Taegu funneled through Miryang.

The Red force occupying the reentrant consisted of the majority of the North Korean 4th Division, about 6000 men. This force had crossed the Naktong River at a ferry site in the bend of the river west of Yongsan. Troops, tanks, and artillery were brought across the river at this point during daylight and under cover of darkness over a period of several days. The only road between the ferry site and Yongsan was through the Brigade's zone of action, and since the enemy was advancing directly on Yongsan, we were up against a considerable portion of his 6000 troops.


Since the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, was under the operational control of the 24th Division artillery commander, I reported to him as soon as I had sufficient information on the proposed scheme of maneuver, date of attack, etc. It was while I was in conference with the general's operations officer that I learned that the date of attack was to be the next day, 17 August. There were about five hours of daylight left that day, and the problem facing me was to get back to Miryang, get the battalion on the road, and into position in time to register before dark. The date of the attack had originally been announced as 18 August, so setting it up one day, at that late hour, had us in a sweat. BrigGen Meyer, the 24th Division artillery commander, had had most of his battalions, at one time or another, in all of the likely position areas west of Yongsan. While I went back to Miryang for the battalion, I left my executive officer, Maj Francis R. Schlesinger, in the Yongsan area with instructions to select a position area and to make plans for communications with the division artillery.

By the time I returned with the battalion, just before sunset, Schlesinger had telephone lines run into the position area from DivArty and from the battalions which were to reinforce our fires. Also, he had all the information the army artillery had available on check points, base points, concentrations, and survey data. This came in mighty handy, especially since we got such a late start.

Since the Brigade was to make the main effort, Gen Meyer made available two battalions of his artillery, one light and one medium, to reinforce the fires of my battalion. When the attack began on the morning of the 17th, we were in a position to furnish almost any amount of artillery fire requested.

Knowing that the enemy had tanks on our side of the river, and knowing his propensity for sending his tanks to our rear areas to disrupt communications and to try to scare anyone he could, we occupied a position which fulfilled one of the requirements of a good artillery position, as recommended by Gen Barth. This position area allowed us to have one gun in each battery near the road (which was expected to be used by the tanks) and sited so that if one of those T-34s did break through we could "have at it." (Gen Barth's recommendation was made just as our forces in Korea were receiving sufficient 3.5" rocket ammunition. These rockets effectively dealt with most of the tanks. Even so, we felt it was wise to select gun positions, if at all possible, to comply with the general's recommendation.)

We received considerable counterbattery fire while in the positions we occupied during this action, but we suffered no casualties. After our experiences in Chindong-ni, no one had to be told to dig a foxhole, and it was the state of training and discipline which resulted in our not suffering any casualties. Enemy counterbattery was delivered from T-34 tanks, mounting 85mm guns, from 120mm mortars, and from 76mm and 122mm howitzers.



Captured prisoners who were North Korean artillery officers and men, claimed that their artillery fire was adjusted and controlled by forward observers. These POWs stated that targets, in this case UN artillery, were located by observing flashes and by forward observers, and then plotted on a map to obtain initial data. I personally don't believe that that is the only method they employed in locating targets and in obtaining initial data, but several prisoners steadfastly declared that to be so. There were too many instances of our moving into a position, night or day, only to receive enemy fire immediately after we moved in, for me to take stock in the POW tales. Also, many command posts and supply installations were hit by accurate fire. Usually these installations enjoyed a slight defilade. It is my belief that mingling among the thousands of refugees were the North Korean Army agents, or soldiers in peasant dress, equipped with radios or other means of signaling to the artillery observers who had communication with the firing batteries. The Red artillery fire was extremely accurate. It was amazing how almost every time counterbattery fire was received, only one or two adjusting rounds were required before we would be bracketed.

Fortunately, the Reds didn't have the vast quantity of ammunition we had, the guns, or the brains to know how to take advantage of the opportunities they had.

On 18 August, after the battle had been going strong for two days, our forward observers reported that the enemy could be observed falling back toward the river crossing. These reports were confirmed by our aerial observer, and they substantiated reports received from POWs to the effect that the 4th North Korean Division was to move back across the Naktong commencing at noon, 18 August. Needless to say, when we realized that the Reds were trying to get back across the river, we didn't let them travel the distance unmolested. We worked them over with all that we had, particularly at the spot where they were crossing the river, as we had, fortunately, prepared several concentrations there. The Corsairs from the Brigade's Air Wing were in on the killing, too. Perfect coordination was obtained between our artillery fire and the air strikes. I had one battery firing with VT fuze, one with fuze quick, and the remainder with fuze delay. We thought that the fuze delay would take care of any of those babies that might be trying a little underwater swimming. We had a field day, to say the least. Observers reported that the river ran red for days afterwards. What a shoot!

The next day we were back in our "rest" area in Miryang, but the "rest" was more in name than in fact. No sooner had we arrived there than we were alerted to move back to the Masan area, and two days later we had completely closed Masan. Little did we realize at the time that we left Miryang and Yongsan that we would be right back, within 10 days, fighting again over and for the same ground we had so dearly bought.

THE BRIGADE moved into an assembly area near Masan, preparatory to embarking for the Inchon landing. During this time we were in Eighth Army reserve. However, it is axiomatic that the artillery is never in reserve, and rightly so. So, the battalion was directed to move to the original Chindong-ni area again. This time we were 1) in direct support of RCT 5 (Army), and 2) reinforcing the fires of the Army field artillery battalion which was attached to RCT 5. Again, we were under the operational control of Gen Barth's 25th DivArty. We furnished forward observers, however, to only one infantry battalion of the RCT, so in effect that battalion was being supported by a battalion of artillery. We were more fortunate in Chindong-ni this time in having a bit more ground on which to select position areas. Although it meant dividing the battalion with two firing batteries 1000 yards to the flank of the other firing battery and the Headquarters and Service Batteries, I chose this arrangement in preference to occupying the same positions in and around the village. This great dispersion of the bat-

talion made battalion defense perimeter impossible. We didn't like the set-up, but there was little we could do about it. No sooner had we gotten into position with one firing battery and the Headquarters and Service Batteries when we got our usual reception from our old pal, the T-34. We stuck it out again in preference to moving to the only other place available—Chindong-ni village.

We shunned villages for three reasons. One was that the enemy, with his spies, agents among the refugees, and knowledge of the country, knows the names and locations of every one of the villages. By setting up in a village, you materially aid him in his efforts to locate you. Most of the villages, regardless of size, are pretty accurately located on the maps used by the North Koreans. Another important reason for staying out of villages is that your local security problem is increased tremendously by being in or close to them. The Korean houses are made of mud and many of them are surrounded by a mud fence. Stone fences wind in and out among the clusters of houses. There just aren't enough personnel available for security purposes in an artillery battalion to properly protect its men and equipment when the battalion is surrounded by the labyrinth of houses. Finally, villages are extremely unsanitary. The villagers don't know what sanitation means, especially by our standards. As in other oriental countries, the collecting of night soil goes on full swing 24 hours per day, the water in the villages, and elsewhere in Korea, is polluted, and dysentery is everywhere. Give me the open fields.

Being in open fields posed several important problems, all concerned with local security. Korea is very mountainous, although South Korea isn't quite as mountainous as North Korea. One of the North Korean favorite tactics was to send patrols, armed with small mortars and automatic small arms, around the flanks of the front line troops, and hit the artillery with mortar fire from the rear and flanks. The North Koreans, using forced native labor to carry ammunition on those strange looking "A" frame backboards of theirs, could quickly build up a sizable amount of ammunition to throw at an artillery installation. Unless the artillery commander was on the alert all of the time, he might some morning, about the time he is enjoying his 10th consecutive breakfast of "C" ration, suddenly find his outfit receiving mortar fire from more than one direction. The solution to the problem was in the manner of employing the local security personnel. Here is how we handled the problem:

In my reconnaissance party we took as many local security personnel, including South Korean policemen, as we could carry. Once the position area was decided upon and areas delegated for the various battalion installations, the Headquarters Battery commander would select and establish local security posts on the tops of the hills which surrounded the position. Oftentimes this meant having

troops as much as 1000 yards from the battalion position area, but this was necessary in order that the men occupying the posts could have a clear view into the valleys below them. Each post within a battery sector was tied in by telephone to the exec pit or FDC, as the case might be, and frequent checks were made with the men on the posts throughout the night and day. During the day, patrols would be sent into the neighboring valleys and villages. The patrols consisted mostly of South Koreans with a Marine or two for control. After nightfall, we usually moved the posts 50 to 100 yards up or down the ridgeline, and if there was a post so far from the main position area that we would be unable to aid it in the event it was attacked or surrounded, we would move that post in closer to the battalion. Any movement of natives, refugee or otherwise, noticed by an outpost was immediately investigated. Movements of herds of cattle were always closely watched, for the Reds seemed to delight in infiltrating among cattle as they were driven ahead. I know of one battery that was nearly wiped out by infiltrating Reds who had come on the battery position in such a manner. This system of employing local security personnel required many men, particularly because of the many hills which always surrounded the battalion area. It was necessary to prevent surprise. In one instance, the distant outpost personnel were used to direct time fire on an enemy mortar that was attacking the battery. Although we had our share of shelling and of Reds attempting to enter the battalion position area, we never were surprised. It is true that some of the enemy worked their way between the outposts to the position area, but our warning system always gave us time to be ready for them. A close-in perimeter guard was also necessary for each battery for dealing with the Reds who came in between the distant outposts.

Artillery battalions likely to fight over terrain such as that found in Korea and against an enemy employing tactics such as the North Koreans employed, should have an allowance of at least 12 additional telephones, either the EE8 or the sound power type, preferably the latter.



Also, the allowance of wire of the W110 or WD 1/TT type should be increased. These increases are necessary to take care of local security posts. Further there should be an allowance of local security personnel for each battalion. While we were fortunate in having about 20 per cent over our allowance, this soon faded because of casualties suffered and other attrition (loss of 17-year-olds, sickness, etc.). Also, while we were fortunate in having 50 South Korean policemen to be utilized in local security duties, such allocations of the local populace should not always be counted on. They won't always be available, and even if they are, they may not be willing to fight with us. Even if they are available and openly willing to help us, in Asiatic countries particularly, one may find it difficult to know whether his locally acquired help is, in fact, friendly to our cause. As a matter of fact, by the time we had liberated Seoul and were ready to re-embark for Wonsan, all but five of these policemen had either gotten tired or homesick and had been released. There is a definite need, if the artillery is to be able to furnish the necessary support at all times, of enough personnel to man the distant outposts as well as to provide a close-in perimeter defense, especially at night.

Our truck parks were located within 75-100 yards of the firing battery positions on many occasions in order to improve the local security of the battery and of the battalion as a whole. Naturally, the local security measures of the batteries were coordinated at all times by battalion, and our own measures coordinated with the measures taken by adjacent units.

At midnight 31 August, after our particular sector of the front had been somewhat quiet for several days, the Reds attacked in force. We fired continuously from midnight to daylight, 1 September. Reports from the Army unit we were supporting stated that our fire contributed materially in breaking up the attacks. After daylight, activity quieted considerably on our front, and we expected to be ordered momentarily to Pusan to begin unloading for the Inchon landing. Instead, as the Reds were attacking in force in the Yongsan area again, we were ordered to move to the Naktong River area. Pulling stakes on short notice, we began another long motor march to Miryang. This time we took all of our men on the trucks rather than subject them to the torturous train ride. The situation around Yongsan was critical, the Reds being on the edge of the town, and we didn't have time to wait for troops to be transported by train. A new, shorter and easier route had been opened to Miryang, and we made the trip in about six hours rather than the usual 17. One thing I can say for these long moves, and that is that we got a lot of practical lessons in time and space factors.

On 2 September the Brigade moved into an area about eight miles behind Yongsan, preparatory to attacking in

the Yongsan area the next day. At dusk that day we received our orders, began our reconnaissance for position area, and found one—the only one suitable for artillery. It was right alongside an Army battalion of artillery. In a space less than 350 yards long by 100 yards deep were two artillery battalions, truck parks, fire direction centers, etc. To further complicate matters, during the night some 30 trucks from an engineer unit moved in on us. Fortunately, our displacement into this area was after dark, except for the reconnaissance party and one gun with which we registered before complete darkness set in. Had the North Koreans known such a large concentration was in this area they surely would have let us have it that night.

During our operations on this front this time we were under the operational control of the 2d Division artillery commander. I tried to report to him, personally and by telephone, but I had no luck. He had been cut off from the rest of the division for a couple of days and no one could reach him from division headquarters. However, things were worked out satisfactorily, and again we had two Army artillery battalions reinforcing our fires. Having fought over the area once before, we pulled out our old fire chart and used it to advantage in plotting areas where the enemy would likely mass men and equipment. During the three days that the operation took place, 3, 4 and 5 September, heavy smoke from burning villages and clouds made observation from our OYs very difficult, often impossible in certain areas. Our forward observers were, as usual, in the best possible positions for observation and were very accurate in target designations. The targets consisted of mortars, machine guns, and field pieces, with occasional troop concentrations large enough to justify the use of artillery fire. Very heavy preparations were fired each morning prior to the attack. During these three days 1-11 fired some 5000 rounds of ammunition of all types and destroyed, in addition to mortars and machine guns, six antitank guns, one light tank, and one medium tank. Also, we destroyed 21 field pieces. Inspecting the battle ground after the operation, and observing it from the air during the battle, we noted that the enemy had lined up 18 field pieces of various calibers along the road which ran parallel to our axis of advance, apparently with the intention of massing his fire on us. We destroyed his weapons and killed the gun crews before they had an opportunity to do any damage at all to us. Needless to say, our morale was sky high after such wonderful results, and it remained that way.

The Korean terrain certainly is not the best for artillery position areas. Mountains and rice paddies see to that. Ground which often looked favorable was found later to be inaccessible due to lack of solid ground approaches, principally because of ubiquitous rice paddies. Consequently, it was of little use to make a map recon-

naissance for position area prior to an actual reconnaissance. Wherever we selected a position, however, we always dug in guns, CP, FDC, and sick bay, if the ground permitted. For this we employed our 'dozers, which were worth their weight in gold. By the time we left the Nak-tong for Pusan on 6 September, the 'dozers were pretty well shot. We always shipped the tractors by rail when we could, but all of our fighting took place from 15 to 40 road miles from the railheads, and they were sent overland from the railhead to the front. The extremely dusty, rough, mountainous roads over which the operators had to take the 'dozers are not recommended for prolonging the life of the tractor—or of the operator.

The original maps we had were almost as bad as no maps at all. For the Chindong-ni area, for example, the sheets had no contours, not all of the villages were shown, only a few of the roads, none of the hills, and only some of the streams. They were also inaccurate as to scale. This condition was understandable, since the Korean conflict had developed so rapidly and there just had not been enough time to make the necessary maps. The maps furnished for the Inchon-Seoul operations, however, were excellent, extremely accurate for artillery fire, and plentiful.

The target grid system of fire direction, as described by Maj J. A. Pounds, III, in the October 1949 GAZETTE, was used. Since this system was developed and adopted after World War II, we were anxious to compare it with the system employed during the last war. We found that the target grid system was a definite improvement over the old system, but that, overall, it was a little slower. The inherent advantage that almost anyone with this system and the ability to estimate distances and read a compass can shoot a problem, certainly proved its worth.

The advantages and disadvantages of the system, as we found them to be, are practically word for word the same as Maj Pounds anticipated them to be. Two important advantages of the system worth mentioning are a) the system saves ammunition, and b) there are more potential observers. Relative to the latter point, our casualties





among the forward observers were high, as we had expected them to be. Lacking trained commissioned forward observers as replacements, we often had enlisted men carrying on, having learned the procedure mostly by association with the formally trained FOs. These enlisted FOs did a wonderful job.

Among the disadvantages worth mentioning here are (a) The new system placed a heavy additional work load on the FDC. Often we had three different missions being fired at one time. With computers talking, radio operators carrying on necessary conversations or repeating commands from the observers, and other necessary talking, only the highest degree of training and discipline within the FDC prevented the place from becoming a mad house. (b) A firing chart is required for each mission, thus adding to the equipment already necessarily a part of the FDC. The paper target grids furnished us were flimsy and very difficult to handle. They were not durable enough for our needs; and (c) Somewhat longer period of time is required for registration and for precision destruction problems. All in all, the system is a great advance in the field of artillery.

In our efforts to locate the enemy artillery we employed, in addition to other means, flash ranging. The enemy was skillful in his efforts to deceive us. His camouflage and his camouflage discipline usually were excellent, particularly for one or two pieces of artillery or a tank which was to be used as artillery. His use of smokeless powder and intermittent firing made spotting difficult. At night, he usually placed his gun or tank near a burning house or in a burning village—and these were everywhere along the front—in order to hide the flash. Further, the unending series of hills of various sizes and shapes always interfered with observation. He usually did not fire his artillery when our aircraft were in the vicinity, for obvious reasons.

The battalion outloaded in Pusan for the Inchon landing and sailed therefrom on 10 September. The pe-

riod from 6-10 September had been spent in Pusan in assimilating new men and equipment. We received sufficient men and equipment to reorganize under the war tables. We were glad to get the men, and we certainly needed the equipment, particularly motor transport, communication, and galley. The rough roads had done more than anything else to wreck our radio jeeps and motor transport.

Landing on Wolmi-do, off Inchon, the battalion reverted to the operational control of the 11th Marines as the Brigade was absorbed by the 1st Marine Division. We continued to fight in support of the 5th Marines, while that fighting organization seized its part of Inchon, captured Kimpo Airfield, and seized its part of Seoul. Later, when the division was moved to the Wonsan, and then to the Hamhung-Changjin Reservoir areas, we continued either in support of or attached to the 5th Marines.

The lessons we learned in South Korea were still in mind, and they paid handsome dividends. I feel that these lessons will apply wherever we fight an enemy who uses the tactics of infiltration. Briefly they are:

1) Stay out of villages and towns if at all possible in selecting position areas for artillery.

2) Wherever possible, so site one gun from each battery that it may be used in an anti-tank role. Our 105mm high explosive antitank ammunition will stop a T-34 or similar tank.

3) As part of the battalion's standing operating procedure, carry local security personnel on the battalion commander's reconnaissance for position. Place local security posts on the hills commanding the valleys, especially those to the rear and flanks. Establish your own patrols, and always have an aggressive patrol policy in operation. It's good life insurance.

4) Keep civilians, refugees, and especially children, out of the position area or camp, if in a rear area. Children were used extensively, especially in the early days of the war, to enter camps for the sole purpose of leaving an armed hand grenade near some unsuspecting person.

5) Wherever possible, select and organize positions to be occupied by the battalion so that at least one battery will be able to fire in any direction.

Finally, one lesson learned by Marines long ago was recalled. Fortunately, we hadn't forgotten it in our training in the States, and we hadn't forgotten it when the Chinese entered the picture in Korea. That lesson is that *every* Marine, regardless of his rank, primary MOS, or job, is essentially an infantryman when it comes to shooting the weapon with which he is armed. What with the extraordinary tasks imposed upon the infantrymen, the combat support troops, and the combat service support troops, there are many of them who are alive today because that lesson has not been and will not be forgotten in the Marine Corps.

US MC



David Lawrence recently wrote: "One of the great accomplishments of the versatile Marine Corps is its method of providing air support of its own for ground operations." (See picture, left). In the February GAZETTE, Capt Lynn W. Griffiths argued that Marine pilots were not allowed to concentrate on their specialty. Now, in rebuttal, Capt Saxon takes his fellow pilot to task

of administrative officers fill the non-flying billets. The fact that Marine officers—both ground and aviation—can wear two or more hats and still operate effectively is one of the primary reasons why we are able to train crack fighting men cheaper than any of the other services. This factor alone has been a selling point for the continued existence of a Marine Corps as such.

But to get back to the basic problem—that of revising the aviation syllabi at the Amphibious Warfare Schools at Quantico or establishing tactical schools for Marine pilots and that of giving the fliers more opportunity to maintain their flying proficiency. Let's take the two phases of this related problem in that order.

Marine aviators aren't the only specialists who would prefer to have their own syllabi or training school. So

Reply to Aviators Should Fly

✻ EVEN AS A MARINE AVIATOR IT'S IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME to agree, even in principle, with the reasoning presented by Capt Lynn W. Griffiths in his article, *Aviators Should Fly* (February GAZETTE).

In the first place, the basic, and only, reason for the existence of Marine Aviation is its two-bladed mission of supporting the Fleet Marine Force in amphibious landings and providing air squadrons for carrier operations. This essential factor was ignored by the author when he suggested, by inference, that an autonomous Marine Air Force be established. Since Marine Aviation does perform its dual mission in conjunction with the four major elements of the Marine Corps it can not be considered as a separate entity, complete with a complicated school system and non-flying officers manning the administrative desks.

Such a move would initiate the destruction of the integrated fighting force that the Marines have been building since the Revolutionary War. Kick out the first bit of mortar and the first brick, then the building soon follows.

Nor are the coffers of Marine appropriations bottomless as Capt Griffiths premised by suggesting that legions

would the Marine artillery officers packing their duffle bags and heading for the Army's artillery school at Fort Sill, Okla. So would the engineers working their Army-issued slide rules at Fort Belvoir, Va. Undoubtedly a poll of the 40 per cent of all Marine officers who have or will someday attend service schools outside the Marine Corps would show that all of them would prefer attending Marine-operated schools. But the relative size of the Marine Corps and its corresponding appropriations prohibit this.

Set up a tactical school patterned after the one operated by the Air Force? Careful scrutiny of the syllabus shows that less than 10 per cent of the course is devoted to flying tactics. The other 90 per cent? Administration; court-martial procedure; supply; information about sister services. Sounds like the curricula at the Amphibious Warfare Schools, doesn't it? Actually, the training is somewhat similar in scope—except that the Air Force officers do not get a chance to work with their contemporaries in the infantry. How does the man on the ground think? What does he want and expect in the field of close air support? These are questions that must be understood and answered before close air support is perfected.

To me, the average Marine flier, it's a source of pride to be able to talk and understand the language of the tank or infantry officer. It's the language spoken *only* by the

By Capt T. J. Saxon

Marine officer. And I don't believe that I'm talking through my gasport either. The effectiveness of such all-around training has been demonstrated in Korea. Both the Marines and soldiers there have expressed extreme gratitude for the effective support and understanding of their problems by Marine pilots.

Note also that the Army is expressing the need for tactical air support squadrons. And patterned similar to what? Marine Corps squadrons—squadrons trained with troops! As Mr David Lawrence proclaimed, "One of the great accomplishments of the versatile Marine Corps is its method of providing air support of its own for ground operations. The Air Force itself has provided nothing like it in Korea, and the foot soldiers there today who are a part of the U.S. Army would give much to be able to get the same kind of air support that the Marine aviators are providing their comrades."¹

Would Capt Griffiths recommend destruction of the air-ground team that has proven so successful that it is recommended by others as a "pilot model?"

Criticism of the career management plan, designed to give the pilots an opportunity to learn administrative techniques that will reap invaluable dividends later in their careers, was also a keynote of Capt Griffiths' article. This program supposedly shackled pilots to desks when they ought to be throttle-bending. Let's examine the record. An examination of flight records (Air Force, Navy, and Marines—including my own) of pilots who served in squadrons, overseas and stateside, during World War II illustrates that there is actually little difference in the flying time logged when non-flying billets were handled by administrative officers and now, when pilots have secondary squadron tasks assigned them. (On this point, perhaps, my sampling was too small to be absolutely accurate. Some 20 pilots of all services were questioned.)

Is this assignment to desk jobs an affliction peculiar to pilots? Ask any Marine officer how frequently he gets shunted into a PX assignment or finds himself with adjutantitis. The Marine infantry commander would like more duty with troops too. So would the Army officer. No, the malady isn't one unique to Marine aviation. It prevails in all the services.

So, the answer to the problem can not be found in establishing an autonomous Marine Air Force, complete with professional desk officers and elaborate schools. Financially this is impossible; and logically it would strike the first note of the death knell for the fightingest air-ground team in history.

Is there, then a solution to this problem? Yes! And it lies primarily in the hands of the pilots themselves and, secondarily, in the operating units—the squadrons.

What can a single throttle-jockey do? Prepare himself individually by off-duty study and research. It's hard to find an infantry officer, Army or Marine, who can't tell you why Gen Robert E. Lee failed to break the "fish-hook" line at Gettysburg. Ask any naval officer about Mahan's concept of naval strategy and you are guaranteed an hour's discussion, complete with facts and conclusion. The Air Force is studded with pilots who can quote strategic bombing reports and argue, pro or con, about various tactical teachings. Where do they acquire this knowledge? Not from tactical schools. They dig it out through individual research and study. Why should Marine pilots be a particular breed of cats—cats allergic to military history? Tactics and weapons will change, but the strategy upon which the successes and failures of yesterday were built remains constant and waiting to be explored. When such books as *Bombing and Strategy*, *The War Reports of General of the Army H. H. Arnold*, *The Navy's Air War: A Mission Completed*, and *The Command of the Air* are available, there is little time for the individual pilot to criticize the Marine Aviation program. He should be too busy studying to improve himself.

❁ WHY INITIATE such a program at the squadron level rather than as part of an organized school system, such as Quantico? Because flying tactics change so rapidly that only the general principles, such as now being taught at Quantico, can readily be incorporated in the syllabi. The squadrons, on the other hand, can easily adjust their training programs to include any new twist coming out of Korea. A flying technique can be shuffled into the squadron's training program within 30 days after it's recommended by units in combat. In another 30 days it can be thoroughly evaluated by the squadron and the pilots' analyzation of its merits recorded.

So, the spade-work in tactical training must rest with the individual pilot. He must cloak himself with thorough knowledge of tactics that have assured success in the past. This knowledge can be gleaned only through individual study and research. Following this comes group study and practice on the squadron level. It's here that experimental tactics will be developed and perfected.

Vituperation of the career management program can not help unless constructive criticism is offered. Individual study will build the foundation for that constructive criticism. An appeal for some professional paper-shuffler to relieve the pilot so he can "aviate" more often isn't the answer. Group training by and within the squadron is certainly a step in the right direction.

So, the whole problem is thrown back into the laps of such pilots as Capt Griffiths. Will they accept the challenge and shoulder the task?

USMC

¹Mr. David Lawrence, *U.S. News & World Report*, Sept. 15, 1951.



IF MAJ DONALD S. BUSH AND HIS CREW OF THE MAG-33 aerial photo unit should forget to pay their 1950 income taxes, Uncle Sam will still be 'way ahead.

In the first four months of the Korean war they gave the U.S. tax payer the best aerial photo bargain he has ever received.

The unit left El Toro for Korea on 14 July (with two F4U-5P Corsair photo planes attached) to provide photo reconnaissance for the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and wound up as the aerial photo "section" for the entire Tenth Corps. By this time it had three F4U-5Ps, but such a job was well above the mission of even a full 24-plane photo squadron, which would normally support a reinforced division.

The photo "section" was practically an orphan outfit with no tables of organization to back it up. The Korean War had caught the Marine Corps without any commissioned photo squadrons. Economy-pinched fiscal '50 had eliminated them. When MAG-33 was beefed up for overseas duty in support of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, a photo unit had to be organized quickly from the available aerial photo specialists, pilots and technicians, in the various photo activities of the First Wing at El Toro.

Maj Bush was a night fighter pilot, the acting Commanding Officer of VMF(N)-513. His only photo experience was as a student at the Navy photo school at Pensacola in the previous winter.

But he had an energetic gift for organization, and he had three experienced photo pilots who had flown with VMP-254 before it had been decommissioned. They were Capt Edward F. Ganschow of Chicago, Capt Kenneth T. Dykes of Santa Ana, California, and TSgt George W. Glauser of Montpelier, Idaho. His technicians had been well trained in various photo squadrons before they were decommissioned.

After it arrived at Itami Air Force Base near Osaka, Japan, on the first day of August, one of the photo section's first assignments was a request from the Commander, Naval Forces, Far East for pictures of the bridges and railroad marshalling yards near Seoul, which fed troops and supplies to the Communists pushing the United Nations army into the southeastern corner of Korea.

MAJ BUSH, covered by Air Force F-51 Mustang fighters from Itazuke, made some of the first aerial pictures of these bridges and marshalling yards at noon one day and had the photographic interpretation report delivered to COMNAVFE in time for the Navy's 7th Fleet to pull an air strike on the targets early the next morning.

When the Inchon landing was being planned, the unit with nothing more than its two F4U-5Ps made all the reconnaissance photos of the port and its surrounding islands, beaches, and tidal flats which were used in the difficult landing on 15 September. The two planes flew 13 sorties in four days to make the coverage. A great deal

of the intelligence information used in the Inchon invasion was obtained from these sorties.

After the assault landing and during the ensuing battle around Seoul, the Tenth Corps wanted reconnaissance pictures of the enemy troop concentrations, roads, and gun emplacements. Beginning 25 September the unit flew 25 sorties, making the pinpoint photos of enemy strong points, road strips, and stereos of suspected hidden positions.

By this time the unit had three F4U-5P Corsairs and six F7F-3P Tigercats, which was its maximum aircraft strength during its first five months in the Korean action.


The work around Seoul was hampered by battle smoke and haze. Some of the flights had to go dangerously low. On one mission, anti-aircraft fire left a hole in the wing of Capt Dykes' F7F big enough for a man to crawl through.



After this battle reconnaissance at Seoul, the Tenth Corps wanted a thorough coverage of the Hamhung-Wonsan area preparatory to the expected invasion there. This stepped up the tempo of the photo work to the point that in 18 days the little mobile unit accomplished a job equivalent to a two years' peacetime output of the El Toro photo lab, according to Maj Bush.

During this time, which was early in October, the section photographed 1500 miles of roads in the new target area and made a series of oblique photos of the beaches which provided panoramic views of all possible landing sites. These were the views which would have been seen by the coxwains of the landing craft.

During one of these oblique missions Capt Ganschow had to take extreme evasive action in the approaches to, and the pull-outs from, his straight-and-steady camera runs to avoid heavy fire from automatic weapons on the shore. One of his escort fighters was hit by a bullet but was able to return to its home base. After its landing, the fighter, an F7F from VMF(N)-542, was found to have all but two strands of one of its main control cables shot away.



Several of the vertical photos of the beaches were made by Capt Lynch, utilizing the special Sonne camera. As his plane flew along, his Sonne camera made one long picture of the area below that he wanted to photograph, the length of the roll of film if he so desired. However, because the shoreline was winding and indented, he made several strips of this nature.

The biggest photo job the unit tackled in Korea was a 2,000 square mile mosaic map of the Hamhung-Wonsan area. Some of the flight lines were 40 miles long, which is a considerable distance in aerial mapping, especially if the flight lines have to be flown by different pilots in different planes (varying from the F4U-5Ps to the F7F-3Ps) on different days. Furthermore, there were about 80 flight lines.

To make the mosaic, all the series of pictures made on all the flight lines had to be pieced together carefully into one huge map.

This required that the scale on every picture be exactly the same. The urgency of the need for the map made it necessary for as many pilots and planes as possible to complete the coverage in as short a time as possible.

It was a difficult assignment for such a small unit. In fact when Maj Bush announced the project, his pilots told him he was out of his mind. Such a job was for PB4Y-2s or P2Vs, not for an assortment of photo fighters.

"Well, we've going to have to give it a try," the Major told them.

To utilize the variety of photo equipment available to make all the pictures to the same scale took some figuring.

The ideal solution would have been to install K-18 cameras with 24-inch lenses in all the aircraft and fly the map in standardized flight lines at 16,000 feet. However, the "section" had but two serviceable A-8 film magazines for the K-18 cameras. These permitted approximately 90 lineal miles on the ground. To use magazines of a smaller capacity would have meant flight lines so short that the aircraft would have had to land constantly for reloading.

An alternative would have been to use K-17 cameras, with 24-inch lenses at 16,000 feet or 12-inch lenses at

Here is the story of an aerial photo reconnaissance unit that went to Korea to support the Brigade and wound up as the "eyes" of Tenth Corps. Truly an orphan outfit, its assignments varied from pictures of bridges to mosaics of the Inchon landing beaches



TSgt Frederick Miller buttons up camera doors of F7F.

8,000. However, these K-17 cameras shooting a nine by nine inch negative would cover a strip only half as wide as that covered by the nine by 18 inch negatives of the K-18. Consequently two narrower flight lines per K-17 were required for every one per K-18.

The "section" decided to install the large K-18 cameras in two of the Corsairs. With 24-inch focal length lenses the "Us" were to fly at 16,000 feet to obtain the photo scale requested by the Tenth Corps. The Tigercats used the K-17s, two cameras per plane because of the extra flight lines. The second camera was cut in when all the film was exposed in the first one. Twelve-inch lenses were used on the K-17s at 8,000 feet in order to avoid the 16,000 foot altitude with its problems of oxygen, higher winds, tilt, etc., for the same end result.

The pilots found themselves flying the F4Us at 16,000 feet on one sortie and the F7Fs at 8,000 feet on the next one, though working on the same map.

The deep canyons in the target area made it advisable for all runs to be flown during the middle of the day in order to take advantage of the overhead sun and to prevent shadows in the important canyon floors. Even though at times six planes were flying the parallel flight strips at once, it took six days to make the huge mosaic.

To keep up with the pilots, the unit's 21 photo technicians, directed by MSgt George H. Brown of Santa Ana, California, and MSgt Mario M. Osimo of Philadelphia had to work two overlapping 14-hour shifts per day to process the films and prints. Their job would have been difficult for twice the personnel.

As fast as these hard working technicians developed and printed the photographs, they were forwarded to the 1st Marine Division where they were rough-laid into the mosaic. "The Division's photo interpreters reported that it was phenomenal the way one day's coverage fitted into the coverage of the day before," Capt Ganschow declared.

As soon as the mosaic was completed, the Tenth Corps climaxed the frenzy of production by requesting 20 prints

per negative of an area previously photographed. Starting at 0100 on 10 October, the lab crews worked 33 hours steadily until 1000 on 11 October and ended with 14,675 nine by 18 inch prints, a small truck load. The men were about to drop. At least they were walking in their sleep.


Finally the Tenth Corps told Maj Bush to knock off the photo work. When he reviewed his unit's activities, he found that from 23 September to 12 October they had flown 107 midday sorties, totalling 239 hours, used up more than 81 rolls (23,610 feet) of film and more than 468 rolls (97,200 feet) of Sonne print paper, and had made the equivalent of 100,000 nine-inch prints.

One remarkable thing was the fact that the "orphan" photo unit was continually short on the film and paper with which to accomplish its work. In order to keep ahead, all hands had to scrounge as never before. Flights were made all over Japan to get photo materials, the Air Force and Army units were contacted repeatedly, and COMNAVFE was virtually emptied of Sonne paper. Other items came from mysterious sources, but it was all for a good cause.

Water had to be hauled continually to keep the dark room going in the portable photo tent. The daily requirement was from 6,000 to 10,000 gallons. The laboratory received running water from a 3,000 gallon rubber storage tank installed outside. This was kept filled by six-by-six dump trucks carrying a 1,000 gallon Rhino pontoon tank. About 10 trips a day were necessary from the water point.

To top it all off, the unit was plagued by having to move every time it had its laboratory fixed for efficient

SSgt P. D. Wright develops film after day's operation.



work. They moved from Itami to Kimpo to Wonsan to Yonpo and then back to Itami in less than three months. Their biggest job, the Hamhung-Wonsan coverage, was accomplished in a photo tent. The photo technicians were jacks of all trades, being constantly in the process of putting in or tearing out plumbing, wiring, and indulging in carpentry work, maintenance and all the other odd jobs of an advance echelon.

Illustrative of the photo unit's versatility was the last day of November when Maj Bush, Capt Ganschow, Capt Simmons, and Lt Adams returned from their last photo assignment out of Wonsan, a long, tedious, four-hour hop. They were met by the word that the unit was to move immediately to Yonpo "that night." This was sad news. They had fixed up a Japanese dark room in a relatively modern building and would have liked to spend the winter there. That evening they had to process their films and tear down the dark room simultaneously. Then when they were set up at Yonpo they had to tear it all down again within two weeks when they were ordered to withdraw to Itami.

By the first of December the photo pilots had flown more than 163 missions, Maj Bush leading with 26. They had grown to rely on the F7F more than on the F4U because of the viewfinder and the greater load versatility. They were able to take the F7F off on a mission with a K-17 (12-inch lens) in the forward end of the camera compartment and a K-18 (24-inch lens) in the rear for verticals and with a six-inch K-17 mounted on the port side for obliques.


"The F4U-5P would be an excellent photo aircraft if it had a finder for viewing the area directly below the plane and for determining wind drift," Maj Bush said. "It is excellent at high altitudes above 20,000 feet and is much more stable than the Tigercat at all altitudes. It would be an excellent all around photo-fighter if it had a viewfinder."

MAJ BUSH AVERRED that the experience of his small unit in Korea, although inadequate for the mission it was called to perform, justified the recommissioning of Marine photo squadrons again and equipping them not only with F4U-5Ps and F7F-3Ps, but with fast jet photo fighters and the up-to-date photo gear necessary for such high speed aerial photo work.

Many of the pilots felt that the value of the Sonne camera was being greatly underestimated by those who called for the photo coverage missions. Due to the efforts of Capt Lynch, who prepared the Tigercats for their overseas work, all of the F7Fs were equipped with Sonne installations, but these had to be removed in favor of the conventional installations.

Later model cameras with faster automatic recycling speeds to permit more pictures in a given period of time

were also in demand by the MAG-33 photo unit. While taking the pre-invasion photos at Inchon, the Corsairs with the 24-inch K-18 installations were forced to fly the flight lines at 8,000 feet because of the low cloud base. The slow recycling time of the cameras required such a



Maj Donald S. Bush

slow air speed in flight that flaps were necessary to keep the cameras level. It was dangerous but fortunately none of the planes was hit. However, on the day following their completion of the mission, an Air Force RB-26 photo plane and an F-80 photo fighter had to give up their runs in the same area because of enemy fire, according to Capt Ganschow.

Every plane in the MAG-33 photo section has met antiaircraft fire at one time or another. The worst flak was experienced by Maj Bush and Capt Dykes. Capt Dykes' experience was over Masan near Seoul when he ducked down between cumulus clouds for a quickie run over a bridge only to have a hole shot in his wing immediately by radar-controlled AA fire. Although the damage just missed his aileron control linkage, his main wing spar, and wing folding mechanism, it was enough to stall him out at a landing speed of just under 140 knots as he came back "hot" but safe to Kimpo in his Tigercat.

Maj Bush said the antiaircraft fire he met over Manpojin on the North Korean border was equivalent if not worse than the ack ack he met in the Solomons in World War II. He had to dodge and turn to throw off the radar trackers before streaking across the target. In fact, he met so much fire that he was sure the Commies had something there they were trying to hide. So he made another run. Fortunately he returned without damage to his aircraft.


The planes were kept in good flying condition by the engineering crew headed by MSgts Edward J. Chipple, William C. Holmes, and Willard C. Averill.

Winter brought problems of visibility and light. On their last flight from Wonsan to photograph enemy supply routes in North Korea, Maj Bush and Capt Ganschow had to fly through two snow storms and severe icing conditions in order to get to the clear sunny photo weather over the target area.

The problems were often unexpected and had to be coped with as they arose.

"I may not have known too much about aerial photography when I took this job, but I certainly have learned," Maj Bush said. "However, I can't help thinking how much nicer it would be to spend my time making a photo recon at Laguna Beach or Balboa." USMC

The Pusan Perimeter Fight For A Foothold



THE 1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE LOST NO time at going into action in Korea. On 14 July 1950, when the ground troops sailed from San Diego, their destination was Japan for a brief training period. During the next 10 days, however, the military situation deteriorated so rapidly that Gen Douglas MacArthur ordered the Brigade to proceed directly to Korea.

On 2 August, as the men landed at Pusan, the enemy was about 40 miles from that seaport. The next morning the main body of the Brigade moved east by rail to a bivouac near Masan in Eighth U. S. Army reserve. And on 7 August, the eighth anniversary of the Guadalcanal landing, the Marines launched the first of three counter-attacks which would restore Eighth Army lines.

Not much encouragement could be derived at that date from the political and strategic background. As early as 10 May the Defense Minister of the Republic of Korea had warned the United Nations Commission that North Korean forces were moving toward the 38th Parallel. He estimated their total strength at 183,000 men and 173 tanks, including 25,000 veterans of Chinese Communist campaigns. The ROK army, hastily built up from a national constabulary, numbered about 100,000 men. Most of the units had received little training, but there was a general lack of such arms as tanks, artillery, and antitank weapons.

On 25 June 1950, when the first NK columns crossed the 38th Parallel, it could not be doubted that the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea was carrying out Soviet policies. Nor was it any secret that the invading army had been trained by Soviet instructors and armed with Soviet weapons.

The United Nations and President Truman met the challenge with dramatic promptness. Military sanctions were ordered against the aggressors on 28 June, and four days later the first U. S. Army troops landed in Korea.

On 2 July the Chief of Naval Operations, with the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, granted Gen MacArthur's request for a Marine RCT with its own air. This was the inception of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, made up of the 5th Marine Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 11th Marines, and MAG-33—a total of 6,534 men, including supporting troops.

BrigGen Edward A. Craig commanded this air-ground team composed largely of troops stationed in California. On 13 July, as Marine embarkation began, LtGen Walton W. Walker assumed command of the Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), numbering 43,146 men in Korea and Japan.

Gen MacArthur had already warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 July to expect a major conflict against a well trained and equipped enemy. His prediction was confirmed during the next three weeks as U. S. and ROK troops fell back before materially superior invaders.

In cooperation with the Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, the GAZETTE herewith presents the first of a series of official accounts dealing with Marine operations in Korea. Prepared by writers and researchers of the Historical Division, these articles are based on available records and reports from units in Korea. The following will be treated in this series:

- Mobilization and Movement to Korea
- Operations in the Pusan Perimeter
- The Inchon-Seoul Amphibious Campaign
- The Chosin Reservoir Breakout
- Anti-Guerrilla Operations in South Korea
- The Drive to the 38th Parallel

Publication is scheduled for consecutive monthly issues, except for mobilization, which will not appear in order.

Admittedly it is too soon to write a definitive history of Marine fighting in Korea. Not only are enemy sources lacking, but even Marine and Army records are still incomplete. Articles of the length to be used in the GAZETTE, moreover, do not allow space for more than an outline of operations which will ultimately be given the detailed treatment of a monograph.

But timeliness is also an end to be sought, and these preliminary narratives are based on Marine and Army reports received up to this time. These articles are presented in the hope that GAZETTE readers will feel free to add to the incomplete record. This is an invitation, therefore, for you to supplement the existing record. Send your comments and criticisms, as well as any other information you can make available, to the Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C.

Taejon (Map, page 30) had to be evacuated on 21 July when the line of the river Kum could not be held. The out-weighted UN forces, their left flank dangling, were unable to prevent the enemy from making an end run in the direction of Pusan.

Nonsan, Namwon, and Hadong fell in dismaying succession to invaders sweeping around to the UN rear, opposed only by militarized ROK police. Gen Walker met the threat on 25 July by shifting the 24th Division (less the 21st Infantry) to the Chinju area with a blocking mission. The North Koreans continued to make daily gains, however, with an estimated two to three regiments of the 6th Division. On the last day of the month they drove southward and eastward to the occupation of Chinju, about 50 miles west of Pusan. On the central front other enemy forces reached the river Naktong, and on the east coast a NK column pushed southward to capture Yongdok from ROK defenders.

EUSAK spokesmen described the situation as "fluid," but the Pusan perimeter was already taking shape. Taegu, the hub of the rail net, was about 50 miles from Pusan, which meant that EUSAK had a larger perimeter than its scanty forces could defend except at key points. The intermittent "line" of defense positions stretched from the secondary port of Pohang on the east coast to the Naktong, then dipped to the south coast in the vicinity of Masan, only 35 miles from Pusan.

This irregular semicircle, about 120 miles in length, or



a smaller one, had to be held at the peril of a new Dunkirk. The defenders had only seven understrength divisions on 1 August. EUSAK consisted of the 24th Division and most of the elements of the 25th and 1st Cavalry Divisions—42,199 men in all, including supporting troops. Air Force units added 3,527 to the total. Alongside these U. S. divisions were four battered ROK divisions, in action since 25 June.

Eleven enemy divisions had been identified by this date. The seven which launched the invasion were those numbered from the 1st to 6th, including a large proportion of veterans of Chinese Communist campaigns, and the 15th. Four more divisions, hastily raised from border constabulary units, were thrown into action before the end of July.

At the outset Gen MacArthur had necessarily to draw upon occupation forces in Japan, including many recent recruits not ready for combat. The first contingents, making contact with the enemy on 5 July, found themselves plunged into a melancholy land of bleak mountains and fetid rice paddies. Friend could not readily be distinguished from foe in a swarming Oriental population, and too often a group of supposed South Korean civilians proved to be disguised enemy soldiers.

Throughout July an atmosphere of failure and confusion oppressed the men at the front and communicated itself to the public at home. Pearl Harbor had been a shock that energized and united Americans in a day. Korea, in contrast, was only enough of a disillusionment to arouse grumbling. It was hard for soldiers and civilians alike to realize that an Asiatic peninsula might become the Spain of a third World War.

August threatened to be a critical month for Pusan, caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. Thus the arrival of the Marines was timely, following the debarkation of the 2nd Infantry Division and Army 5th RCT at Pusan the day before.

Reinforcements were sorely needed at a time when five of the seven UN divisions had neared exhaustion. Since the perimeter could not be held in strength everywhere, EUSAK orders of 2 August called for counterattacks against penetrations to disorganize enemy columns, keep them off balance, and prevent them from launching a coordinated effort. At this turning point the Marine air-ground team constituted a welcome unit to be shifted from one sector to another as a mobile, self-contained reserve.

On 4 August the Plans Section of EUSAK completed a study of plans, later approved, for a counterattack along the Masan-Chinju-Hadong axis. Two days later Task Force Kean—named after MajGen William B. Kean, CG of the 25th Division—was organized with a mission of driving west toward Chinju to secure Masan, a secondary port, from future enemy attempts. The primary



BrigGen Edward A. Craig, USMC, confers with MajGen John H. Church, CG of 24th Division on plans designed to drive the North Koreans out of the Naktong River bulge.

object was to prevent NK forces in the Chinju area from cutting the Eighth Army off from its Pusan base. This peril was considered imminent in view of reported large hostile troop movements toward the southern front. Later intelligence led to the conclusion that the main enemy effort would be made farther north in the Yongsan sector of the central front. But the plans were not changed, as it was hoped that the Chinju operation would relieve NK pressure on the threatened central front.

Task Force Kean had as its components the 25th Division, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (plus an ROK police company), and the Army 5th RCT. The main body of the Marine ground forces, after proceeding by rail on 3 August from Pusan to the Changwon bivouac near Masan, spent three days in EUSAK reserve. Routine patrols were sent out while the Brigade occupied tactical dispositions astride the Masan-Changwon corridor in preparation for further operations. Nervous bursts of night firing occurred in all battalion areas, but no casualties resulted.

These patrols were believed to have provided the occasion for the first air-drops of rations and water by helicopter as well as evacuation of heat casualties. The presence of an enemy patrol was confirmed only once, but no contact could be made with North Korean soldiers who abandoned their observation post and escaped.

The three days in EUSAK reserve were valuable as an orientation and training period. Despite its hasty buildup, the Brigade could be considered an outfit of combat-ready troops. The 1st Battalion, commanded by



ABOVE: Soon after arrival, the Marines marched through Pusan to the railway station for their trip to the front. **LEFT:** Following winding trails over mountainous terrain, the last part of the movement to the front found the Marines subjected to intense heat of Korean summer.



LtCol George R. Newton, was fairly typical. About 300 of the men had been training at Camp Pendleton when the Brigade was activated. Most of the remaining 400 troops of the battalion had thereafter joined from posts and stations on the West Coast. The latter had received no training with the battalion on field problems, but all were basically well grounded. An experienced and able group of officers and NCOs provided a high order of leadership. During the trans-Pacific voyage they conducted shipboard instruction at the squad and platoon level.

The Brigade moved into an assembly area at Chindong-ni (Map, page 30) on 6 August after being attached to the 25th Division. Relief of a battalion of the 27th Infantry was accomplished by 3/5, under control of CO 27th Infantry for this action. Gen Craig resumed full Brigade control after his other two battalions moved into attack positions that night.

A new chapter of Marine Corps history had begun, and it was fitting that a rifle platoon should draw first blood. Shortly after dark, while the Brigade was still under Army control, CO 27th Infantry directed that a platoon of 3/5 proceed several miles forward to protect the flank of a company reporting heavy pressure. The 1st Platoon of George Company and a MG section were sent by CO 3/5 with a mission of seizing a ridge line. During the advance the first Marine battle casualties of Korea occurred about 0500 on 7 August when enemy



artillery shells wounded two men. Two hours later Lt John J. H. Cahill led 39 men up a slope swept by NK automatic fire. He took his objective at 0900, after making contact with the 27th's infantry company, and held for 24 hours under sporadic mortar and automatic fire until being relieved the next morning by Dog Company of 2/5. Six men of the detachment were killed and 12 wounded, in addition to heat casualties.

The story of the war in Korea might have been written in terms of such rifle platoon actions. Although the American public had been conditioned by irresponsible concepts of push-button warfare, the actual showdown called for the timeworn fundamentals of sound infantry training.

The attack plan of 7 August provided for the Army 5th RCT to jump off at 0630 from positions just beyond Chindong-ni after a brief air-artillery preparation. These assault troops had orders to pass through and relieve the 27th Infantry before advancing to clear the road junction west of Chindong-ni (Map, page 30). When that mission had been accomplished, the Marine Brigade was to jump off from the road junction and initiate its attack along the route toward Kosong. Meanwhile the 5th RCT would continue to advance along the northern fork of the road toward Chinju.

This plan remained in effect until the Army 5th RCT was held up by opposition northwest of Chindong-ni. CG 25th Division then directed that a battalion of Marines relieve the 2d Battalion, Army 5th RCT, so that the attack could proceed. This mission fell to 2/5 of the Marines, and at 1100 the battalion moved out from Sangnyong-ni. Enemy automatic and mortar fire held up the advance, but the extreme heat did as much to delay troops making an exhausting climb. At dusk the Marines had not been able to complete the relief, and an early morning attack was necessary to fight through and relieve the Army battalion. Eight men were killed and 28 wounded in the Marine battalion.

Such stubborn enemy resistance had developed in this area that three days and nights of slugging would ensue before the road junction had been fully cleared. This task absorbed the efforts of the Marine Brigade as well as

An artillery unit goes into position and gets ready to fire. Helicopter will be used to spot results.

elements of the Army 5th and 27th Regiments. At 1120 on 7 August Gen Craig was directed by CG 25th Division to assume command of all Army as well as Marine units in the area—a responsibility which he held until relieved by oral instructions late in the afternoon of 9 August after the road junction was cleared.

Where possible the Marine Brigade operated in a column of battalions passing through and relieving one another at successive objectives. Not only was the rugged terrain a factor, but the battalions still had only two rifle companies.* The great frontages typical of the Korean operations required battalions to commit two companies abreast, leaving no reserve echelon.

❖ SLOW PROGRESS in clearing the road junction was made during the daylight hours of 8 August by the Brigade and Army troops against enemy units identified as the 83rd Motorized and the 13th and 15th Infantry of the 6th Division. The Marines learned to respect a hardy enemy for his skill at camouflage, ambush, infiltration and use of cover. They learned that supporting air and artillery fires often had limited effect on a foe making clever use of reverse slope defenses to offset Marine concentrations. Thus a ridge might protect and conceal an enemy strong point until attackers were too close for supporting fires. At that stage the affairs turned into a fire fight with small arms in which the North Koreans were at no disadvantage despite their handicap in air and artillery.

Rear areas and supply routes were seldom safe from infiltration. A noteworthy example was supplied on the night of 8 August when the enemy threw a road block across the Masan-Chindong-ni MSR behind 2/5, delaying the relief of that Marine battalion by a battalion of the 24th Infantry. CG Brigade ordered 3/5 to the rescue from positions in the vicinity, with two battalions of the 24th Infantry in support. Slow progress was made in staggering heat on the morning of 9 August. Artillery fires and napalm strikes were delivered to enable How Company to seize the high ground commanding the road block. Not until late that afternoon was the weary 2d Battalion relieved.

Meanwhile 1/5 had been ordered on 8 August to advance from defense positions at 2300 in conjunction with an Army 5th RCT effort to complete its mission of clearing the road junction. Although the Leathernecks had to cross a mile-long rice paddy to relieve an Army 5th RCT battalion, not a shot was fired at the single-file column. At 0600, after completing relief, the Marines attacked to seize Objective 1, the high ground to the immediate front. Again the lack of resistance was bewildering, and orders were received to continue the advance along the road to-

*At Camp Pendleton, as part of the transition from a peace to war footing, third platoons were activated on 5 July. Third companies did not join the Brigade, however, until after operations ended in the Pusan Perimeter.



ward Paedun-ni. About a third of the distance had been covered without opposition when the battalion set up defense positions for the night.


The late afternoon of 9 August dated a turning point. Army 5th RCT reported that the road junction had at last been cleared, permitting forward movement along the northern route toward Chinju. Three days of hard and often confused fighting had dislodged the enemy and forced him into full retreat along both roads in the direction of Kosong and Chinju. These results had been accomplished during a decisive first phase in which Gen Craig held overall command in the forward area. Then, on 10 August, Army elements of the 5th and 27th Regiments reverted from Brigade command to 25th Division control.

The fleeing enemy offered little opposition to the advance of the 10 August. After occupying Paedun-ni at dawn, the Marines advanced 10 miles along the road without any serious action except an attempted enemy ambush defeated by LtCol Harold S. Roise's 2d Battalion with air and tank support.

FATIGUE AND HEAT continued on 11 August to be the main foes of troops who had known little sleep or rest in four days and nights. As the Brigade moved toward Kosong against light opposition, the 35th RCT had covered most of the distance to Chinju along the northern axis. Pockets of resistance were encountered, but the enemy was withdrawing everywhere and even abandoning equipment. The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines hastened this process by shelling Kosong. Enemy transport led a disorderly flight from the town, and Marine air had a turkey shoot at the expense of a column estimated at 40 vehicles. About half were destroyed and the rest damaged in repeated attacks by the Corsairs.

Although the UN forces were criticized for being road-bound, this episode hinted that the enemy had fewer difficulties because he had fewer vehicles. Only human transport could traverse the rice paddies and hilltops; but the North Koreans were driven to that expedient by UN planes which controlled the roads in daylight hours.

The enemy, according to EUSAK estimates, began the invasion with 122 planes of all types, most of which were destroyed by the middle of July. Only infrequent flights by single aircraft were reported afterwards, and Marine fliers met no resistance in their element. Despite the enemy's lack of air reconnaissance, his artillery was surprisingly effective at times. As an example, a 122mm projectile knocked out one of our 105mm howitzers with a direct hit on 7 August, killing two men and wounding eight of B Battery, 11th Marines. Enemy intelligence commanded respect, and his intermittent firing practices permitted well camouflaged gun positions to be long concealed from air observation.



The evacuation of Kosong occurred just as LtCol Robert D. Taplett's 3/5 passed through the other two battalions. Beyond the town the fast-moving advance troops bore down on the NK 83rd Motorized in the confusion of escape, and infantry combined with air to leave the road strewn with enemy dead and wrecked transport. Some of the Soviet-made vehicles were captured intact and put to good use by Marines slowed by transport shortages and limitations.*

At dusk on 11 August, after reaching high ground 2,400 yards west of Kosong, the Brigade halted with orders to attack toward Sachon in the morning. The 1st Battalion leapfrogged the 3rd at daybreak and advanced for seven hours against negligible opposition to a ridge within sight of Sachon. It could hardly have been imagined at this moment that a beaten enemy was coiled to strike his two boldest blows of the campaign.

*Many vehicles were left on the dock at San Diego because of shipping shortages. But the Brigade discovered that even the full allowance of equipment would not have been sufficient.



The first developed when 24th Infantry elements were surprised by enemy infiltrating 25 miles to the rear and overrunning artillery positions on the MSR west of Chindong-ni. At noon on 12 August, CO 5th Marines, carrying out 25th Division instructions, ordered 3/5 to the new road block by motor lift. Arriving at 1600, G and H companies attacked to secure their first objectives before dusk. Several hot fire fights took place the next day before How Company advanced with supporting air, artillery, and 4.2 mortar fires to clear the MSR.

Meanwhile, as the other two Marine battalions continued the advance toward Sachon, the enemy demonstrated that ambush as well as infiltration was an ever-present threat of North Korean tactics. At 1400 on 12 August the 1st Battalion, with a reconnaissance company detachment leading, entered a U-shaped defile east of the town.

This was the beginning of the affair known as the Sachon Ambush (Map, page 35). As a test of Marine and enemy techniques, it is perhaps the most instructive fire fight of the operation.

The reconnaissance detachment, acting as the point, promptly unmasked enemy intentions by spotting four NK soldiers hurrying toward their machine gun emplacements (Point C). Fire was immediately opened when return fire revealed additional positions (Points A). Baker Company deployed on the left side of the road and Able on the right.

A platoon of tanks, attached to the battalion, soon got into the fight. Maneuver was prevented by rice paddies lying between the road and high ground. But tank fires were directed by platoon leaders using such SCR 536s as had not been put out of commission by mud and water. CO Baker Company, after orienting himself, further briefed the tanks on his SCR 300. After rogering for this orientation, the tanks put down the fire requested by platoon leaders.

Tanks covered the laborious advance of the 3rd Platoon of Baker Company across an ankle-deep rice paddy to seize a hill on the left flank. Covered by these support-

ing fires, the 3rd Platoon reached the crest of Hill 202 but was driven back by superior enemy numbers counter-attacking from the reverse slope. Artillery was called into action to get the platoon off the hill. The Corsairs strafed the indicated area with repeated runs, and artillery laid down about 30 minutes of fire.

Nearly every supporting arm had figured in a combat which might otherwise have cost Baker Company far more than the actual three dead and 13 wounded. At 1745 the battalion advanced again to occupy the high ground to defend for the night. This advance caught the enemy withdrawing and killed 38 at no cost to the Marines in casualties.

✱ WORD CAME just before midnight that the Brigade had 25th Division orders to move to a new front. In the 1st Battalion area the two rifle companies were separated by a gap of 800 yards covered by 4.2 mortars and artillery. At 0450, with the withdrawal beginning, a flare revealed artillery as well as 4.2 and 81 mortar fire laid down almost in the laps of the infantry. As a final touch, three 3.5 rocket launchers were credited with knocking out two machine guns and killing the crews.

By daybreak Baker Company had reorganized for a counterattack, but Battalion ordered the withdrawal to continue as supporting fires escorted the covering 2nd Platoon safely down the slope. This last fight cost the company 12 killed, 16 wounded, and nine missing, presumed dead.

The Leathernecks were reluctant to turn their backs on Sachon with the final objective within grasp. It doubtless seemed to them that the six-day operation had accomplished nothing, since Army units advancing on Chinju were also pulled back from their objective. But events were to prove that the enemy had been stopped cold after penetrating within 35 miles of Pusan—the high tide of the North Korean advance. Never again would the invaders be able to mount a serious threat on this sensitive southern front. In this operation Brigade estimates placed the casualties of the three NK regiments at about 1,900.

CG 25th Division ordered the Marines to withdraw from the vicinity of Sachon by motor and LST to the Chindong-ni area, and the 3rd Battalion (with its road clearing mission completed) reverted to Brigade control. The men proceeded from Chindong-ni by motor lift to the railhead at Masan, where they had their first hot meal since landing in Korea nearly two weeks before. Unhappily, the train pulled in before half of them had eaten. The Brigade reached its assembly area at Miryang on 14 August. There it passed by EUSAK orders to operational control of the 24th Division.

The Marines had scarcely time to clean their weapons at Miryang before being sent back into action again.

Marines crouch near burning North Korean tank as other Marines begin to deploy after crossing a rice paddy.



Enemy pressure in the Naktong Bulge of the central front had created a menace even before the Sachon-Chinju operation ended. This situation resulted in 24th Division orders for the Brigade to move by Army and organic motor lift on 16 August to previously reconnoitered positions in the Yongsan area (Map, page 35).

The NK 4th Division had established two Naktong bridgeheads and crossed to occupy strong positions along ridge lines. Farther north in the U. S. 24th Division sector, the NK 29th Regiment of the 10th Division had also penetrated east of the river. EUSAK concluded that the enemy would drive toward Taegu or attempt to sever the Taegu-Pusan MSR, and counterattacks were ordered to hurl the invaders back across the river.

Along the line of departure the Eighth Army forces consisted from left to right of the Marine Brigade, 9th Infantry, 34th Infantry, and 1st Battalion of the 21st Infantry. Enemy forces east of the river were estimated at a reinforced division supported by artillery and tanks.

The fight of 17 August will always be known to the Marines by the name of Obong-ni Ridge. This enemy strongpoint in the immediate front of the Brigade consisted of mortar and machine gun emplacements along the reverse slope of a barren, rocky spur ranging from 100 to 150 meters in height.

THE 2D BATTALION led the Marine advance from a Brigade line of departure just east of the ridge, designated as Objective 1. As the men climbed the slope on a two-company front, they were held up by flanking automatic fire from the vicinity of Tugok (Map, page 38) on the right and right rear. This opposition came from the zone of the 9th Infantry, which had met heavy resistance on ridges north and east of Tugok.

The delay in the 9th Infantry advance compelled the Marine Brigade to ask permission for neutralizing the Tugok area with air and artillery fires. Meanwhile the 2d Battalion fought its way to the top of Obong-ni Ridge three times, only to withdraw to defense lines halfway down the slope after finding the position untenable. Repeated Marine air strikes blasted the enemy along the reverse slope, but in effect was limited by a shortage of the napalm bombs which would have been better for this work than the high explosive used.

Dog and Easy Companies held tenaciously as the enemy rolled fragmentation and concussion bombs down the slope. At 1500 the 1st Battalion passed through to continue the assault. Advancing in platoon columns against flanking as well as frontal fire, Able and Baker companies paid with casualties for every foot of stony ground. The sun had set when the battalion fought its way to the top, and during the last minutes of daylight three NK tanks approached on the road curving around the ridge into Marine positions.



Taking advantage of cover afforded by tank, Marines direct fire from tank to knock out enemy strong point.

Up to this time Company A of the 1st Tank Battalion had encountered no enemy armor. But on the evening of 17 August a Marine tank platoon, supplemented by 75 recoilless and 3.5 rocket fires, finished off the three hostile tanks in a few seconds, killing all crews. More lessons would be needed, however, before the enemy amended his suicidal tactics of attempting to harass infantry or raid supply lines with unsupported armor. Meanwhile the Marines continued their close cooperation between tanks and infantry, each supporting and protecting the other.

The men of the 1st Battalion expected a counterattack on Obong-ni Ridge and they were not disillusioned. At 0230 on 18 August the glare of 81mm illuminating shells revealed the enemy closing in rapidly. Each NK squad in turn ran forward, hurling grenades and firing burp guns, then hit the deck while another squad advanced. Although the Marines opened up with everything they had one platoon area was isolated and two others penetrated. It was nip and tuck until daybreak, when air and artillery supporting fires aided in restoring positions. By that time Able Company had four officers and 100 men left, while Baker Company had been reduced to two officers and 110 men.

At 1000 the 3rd Battalion passed around the right flank and swept on to take Objectives 2 and 3, the high ground beyond Obong-ni Ridge. Opposition was light and large quantities of arms and ammunition were captured. Enemy resistance seemed to have been broken by heavy losses, and North Korean troops were swimming the Naktong to escape.

Marine ground forces agreed that the close air support in this operation merited superlatives. VMF-214 and VMF-323, operating from aboard the CVE *Sicily* and CVE *Badoeng Strait*, had worked out an effective alternating system for tactical air. After aiding in the reduction of all three objectives, the Corsairs found lucrative targets in the North Korean forces streaming back across the Naktong in disorderly retreat.



In the haste of withdrawal the enemy abandoned much equipment, including artillery, after suffering casualties estimated as high as 4,000. The Army units had met much less resistance on the Marine right, and all forces continued on 19 August to mop up the last pockets of resistance east of the river. Marine patrols were able to make no contact with the enemy that afternoon as orders released the Brigade from 24th Division to EUSAK control. Relief was effected by elements of the 24th Division in defense lines along the high ground of Objective 3. All units closed Yongsan that night and proceeded on 20 August to an assembly area at Changwon in EUSAK reserve.

The period from 22 August to 2 September was devoted to training in weapons familiarization and small unit tactical problems. Several hundred replacements joined the Brigade. Patrols were sent out behind the 25th Division zone of action, and the 1st Battalion of the 11th Marines was detached to CG of that division by EUSAK orders to conduct supporting fires in the Chindong-ni area.

Late in August it became evident that the enemy was poised for a strong new effort to smash through the Pusan perimeter. Several new units had been hastily organized from constabulary troops, so that NK strength was estimated at 13 infantry divisions, three security regiments, an armored division, and two separate armored regiments — a total of about 133,000 men.

On 1 September, when the blow fell, the Marine Brigade was alerted at 0810 by CG EUSAK for a possible

move to some unknown destination. At this time all units were engaged in transferring heavy equipment and supplies to Pusan for the contemplated amphibious landing which would later be known as the Inchon-Seoul operation. Brigade orders were immediately issued to suspend embarkation preparations and stand by for EUSAK orders.

At 1215 EUSAK directed the Brigade to proceed by motor to Miryang (Map, page 35). The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines reverted to Brigade control on this date and rejoined the infantry battalions.


All units closed Miryang by 0630 on 2 September and moved by orders of CG EUSAK toward Yongsan (Map, page 39). Enemy gains east of the Nakdong had created the urgent necessity for counterattacks. Yongsan itself had fallen when EUSAK ordered a reinforced Marine battalion to move into the vicinity and protect movement of remaining Brigade elements into an assembly area. There the Marines were to prepare for operation in the 2d Division sector.

AFTER BEING BRIEFED by CG 2d Division in regard to the enemy breakthrough, Gen Craig made recommendations for the employment of the Brigade. The 2d Division plan of maneuver called for the 9th Infantry, which had retaken Yongsan, to hold the high ground 800 yards to the west until the Brigade could pass through the next morning and continue the attack. The 23rd Infantry and 38th Infantry were in line to the right, and the high ground on the left was occupied by a special task force made up of the 72nd Tank Battalion and the 2nd Engineer Battalion. No other force was available to protect 2d Division's left flank. Enemy forces in the immediate front were believed to be elements of the 2nd, 4th and 9th NK Divisions.

At 0300 on 3 September the Marines moved out to attack positions only a few miles northeast of Obong-ni Ridge. This was the first time that the Brigade used a formation of two battalions abreast and one in reserve. The jumpoff was delayed 30 minutes by necessity of fighting to the line of departure 800 yards west of Yongsan. But shortly after dawn the infantry went forward against heavy resistance consisting of automatic, tank and artillery fires.

Brigade tanks destroyed four T-34s and the ground troops inflicted an estimated 500 casualties during the first day's advance. The 2d Battalion, which met particularly stiff opposition, had casualties of 18 dead and 77 wounded.

At dusk, after seizing high ground about 3,000 yards west of Yongsan, the 1st and 2nd Battalions dug in and occupied defense lines for the night. On 4 September the Brigade continued the attack at 0800 as the 3rd Battalion passed through the 2nd and advanced on the right of the



1st. The assault troops gained an average of 3,000 to 4,000 yards against moderate opposition and took the high ground designated as Objective 1.* CG 2d Division authorized a farther advance to phase line two, and the Brigade pushed ahead about 1,000 yards past Objective 1 before consolidating positions for the night.

Again Marine close air support was magnificent, accounting for many of the enemy dead which littered the roads along with abandoned equipment. Marine tanks and antitank fire knocked out two T-34s and four antitank guns during the day. Counterbattery work by 1/11 resulted in the destruction of an estimated nine field pieces and the killing of several hundred retreating NK troops.

On 5 September the Brigade advance scheduled for 0730 had to be postponed until 0815 because of an enemy counterattack in the 9th Infantry area on the right. Rains favored the enemy by making OY observation and close air support impossible. Marine artillery fires, moreover, had to be given the 9th Infantry to aid that regiment in restoring its positions. These factors limited the Brigade artillery preparations to barely five minutes. Nevertheless, the Leathernecks covered 2,500 to 3,000 yards that morning against moderate opposition.


Another NK counterattack developed at 1410 in the 1st Battalion area as an estimated 300 enemy struck with three tanks. Two of our M-26 tanks, firing on troop targets in infantry support, did not observe the approach of the T-34s and were disabled by enemy tank fire, though both crews escaped. All three NK tanks were destroyed by rocket fire laid down by the 1st Battalion.

Meanwhile Baker Company succeeded in stopping the counterattack with 81 mortar fire at a cost of two killed and 26 wounded.

That afternoon EUSAK orders released the Brigade from 2nd Division operational control for movement to Pusan by motor and rail. After securing high ground and consolidating positions overlooking near-by Obong-ni Ridge, the Marines were relieved at midnight by elements of the 2nd Division. The movement of the Brigade to Pusan was completed by 1100 on 7 September, and heavy equipment arrived by rail from Miryang.

The Leathernecks were not in on the finish, but the back of the enemy offensive had been broken before they left. And the second battle of the Naktong ended with 2nd Division forces pushing the invaders back until the central front was out of danger.

Altogether, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade had fought three difficult operations in a month while traveling 380 miles with a third of its organic transportation



plus Army vehicles. It is a safe assumption, on the basis of field estimates, that these fights resulted in troop and equipment losses that the enemy could ill afford. And though there is no such thing as a "light" casualty list from a personal viewpoint, a total of 169 Marines killed in action, 720 wounded in action and 12 missing in action was a remarkably low price to pay for the gains achieved.

After the arrival of replacements, third companies joined the Brigade on 7 September. Already the men were training for the next test amid preparations for debarkation. The 3rd Battalion had been designated as the advance landing force for the forthcoming amphibious operation, and rehearsals were conducted in the Pusan area before embarkation on 12 September.

Lacking the preception of hindsight, the departing Marines could not evaluate their contribution to the counterattacks which held the Pusan perimeter. But the Brigade had been summoned three times as a hard-hitting mobile reserve, and on each occasion the Leathernecks sent the enemy reeling back at a critical moment. Events would prove after 15 September that these operations were comparable to solid left jabs setting up an opponent for the knockout. For it was a bruised and bleeding North Korean Army, still hammering futilely at the Pusan perimeter, which had the key to its communications threatened a week later in the Inchon-Seoul amphibious operation.

*Fewer and briefer reports were made of the Second Battle of the Naktong than the two preceding operations. This is understandable when it is recalled that the Brigade had on short notice interrupted active preparations for embarkation to help meet this new threat in the Naktong Bulge area.

Next Month: The Inchon-Seoul Amphibious Assault



KOREA AWARDS



Distinguished Service Cross

PFC Frank B. Billings and Sgt Lewis Zwarka.

Legion of Merit

LtCol Thomas J. Ahern, LtCol Charles L. Banks (2d), Col Booker C. Batterton (2d), LtCol Richard A. Beard, Jr., LtCol William E. Benedict, Col Alpha L. Bowser, Jr. (2d), Maj James W. Dodson, Maj James A. Etheridge, LtCol Lawrence C. Hays, Jr., Col Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr. (2d), LtCol Edwin C. Kimball, LtCol John F. Kinney (2d).

LtCol James C. Murray, Jr. (2d), Col Thomas J. Noon, Maj Samuel Richards, Jr., Col Edward W. Snedeker (2d), LtCol Joseph L. Stewart (2d), LtCol Claude H. Welch, BrigGen Gregon A. Williams (2d), LtCol Howard A. York, LtCol Donald K. Yost, and LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (2d).

Silver Star

LtCol Norman J. Anderson, Sgt George C. Balchunas, Pvt John L. Bibler, Cpl Clifford C. Blakley, Cpl Richard J. Blasinski, Capt Wallace D. Blatt, Sgt Herbert E. Blizard, Maj Howard W. Bollmann, PFC James R. Brown, Maj James M. Callender, 1stLt Nicholas A. Canzona, PFC Francis Carter, PFC Walter B. Cater, Jr., PFC James P. Cavanaugh, PFC Gum Shoon Chin, 1stLt Truman Clark, 2dLt Doyle H. Cole, LtCol "J" F. Cole, PFC Jack N. Coley, Capt Thomas E. Cooney, PFC Ernest J. Cordova.

Capt Otis W. S. Corman, LtCol Raymond G. Davis, 2dLt Mayhlon L. Degernes, PFC Edward G. Dennis, SSgt Sawaren J. Dennis, PFC William J. Dougherty, PFC Charles E. Durant, Jr., Maj Harold A. Eisele, TSgt Bert L. Elliott, 1stLt Lloyd J. Engelhardt, Capt George B. Farish, PFC William T. Farrell, Cpl Jack E. Flack, LtCol Paul J. Fontana, PFC Ralph D. Fouts, 1stLt Frederic A. Gessner, PFC Richard H. Gettys.

CWO Jack W. Goodall, Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk, Sgt Harold R. Graham, Sgt Manuel F. Gutierrez, 2dLt Edmund W. Hanlon, 1stLt Howard H. Harris, LtCol Jack Hawkins, Sgt Robert D. Hepler, PFC Harry S. Hobbs, PFC Walter R. Holder, PFC Bruce B. Hough, PFC John Hruschanko, 1stLt Frederick M. Humphrey, 1stLt John H. Jaeger, Capt David G. Johnson, 1stLt Victor E. Johnson.

Cpl Robert E. Jones, PFC Walter F. Kasterko, MSgt Wayne H. Kerr, Sgt Joseph Komoroski, TSgt George Kostrey, PFC Gerald A. Kraus, TSgt Paul B. Kroesen, TSgt Frank J. Lawson, SSgt Calvin E. Lee, Maj Christian C. Lee, Col Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr., Maj Arnold A. Lund, Maj William M. Lundin, 2dLt Billy C. Marks, Cpl Commodore C. McNeill, Cpl Joseph R. Medeiros, Capt Henry D. Menzies, Pvt Bernard E. Metivier.

PFC Harry E. Miles, Capt Gene W. Morrison, Sgt Vincent E. Mosco, SSgt Russell A. Munsell, 1stLt John J. Murphy, CWO Marvin G. Myers, PFC Edward T. Nelson, MSgt Casey

R. Nix, 2dLt Jack L. Nolan, SSgt Augustine Oberg, Sgt Robert L. Oldani, Cpl Harry F. Orlish, PFC Pete Orozco, Cpl Edward D. Overvold, Capt Ernest W. Payne, 1stLt Kenneth H. Quelch, Cpl Corbett A. Ray, Sgt James H. Ray, Jr.

PFC Thomas P. Riccardi, LtCol Thomas L. Ridge, PFC Reginald A. Riley, Maj Morris E. Roach, Maj Webb D. Sawyer, Cpl Richard T. Schaedel, Maj Francis R. Schlesinger, LtCol Donald M. Schmuck, WO Armon J. Sealey, 1stLt Ernest P. Skelt, Jr., Cpl Thomas J. Spear, Sgt Von Emerson Stockler, PFC William J. Stokley, Sgt Jesse B. Swafford, Cpl Joseph L. Tamborini.

LtCol Robert D. Taplett, 2dLt Francis W. Tief, SSgt Richard S. Trojanowski, Maj Joseph D. Trompeter, Sgt Anthony Trupiano, PFC Roy B. Turnipseed, Sgt Gordon K. Urquhart, 1stLt Donald E. Watterson, PFC Robert T. Welsh, LtCol Radford C. West, PFC Lee D. Wilson, Sgt Ralph F. Worley, and PFC Frank P. Young.

Bronze Star

Sgt David R. Adams, Maj Harold E. Allen, Cpl Cowles Andrus, Jr., LtCol James O. Appleyard, Capt Wade W. Atkins, TSgt Robert W. Barnett, PFC Wayne A. Bass, TSgt George H. Bigelow, Capt Clifford P. Blankenship, SSgt Robert H. Blossch, SSgt Russell J. Borgomainerio, Sgt Wallace G. Bowden, III, Capt Ralph E. Bowen, Maj Kenneth B. Boyd, Capt William E. Brandon, Sgt Robert D. Brooks, MSgt George H. Brown, Capt Leslie E. Brown, Cpl James C. Brunner.

1stLt John A. Buck (1st and 2d), SSgt Robert S. Bunton, TSgt William J. Burk, MSgt Elwood Cabe, 1stLt Donald H. Campbell, TSgt Billy B. Carter, Maj Donald L. Clark, MSgt Horace G. Cline, TSgt George W. Colbert, MSgt Donald G. Courtney, PFC John G. Decker, Sgt William D. Dedic, 1stLt Neil F. Defenbaugh, SSgt Sawaren J. Dennis, PFC Marion L. Deshong, SSgt Leroy W. Dodge, Sgt Roy Doherty, Maj Cleland E. Early, 2dLt Rodger I. Eddy, Sgt Bernard J. Elko.

Maj James A. Feeley, Jr., Capt Francis I. Fenton, Jr., Cpl John J. Flynn, Maj Samuel B. Folsom, Jr., PFC Thomas J. Fox, TSgt Frank F. Fraelle, Sgt Roymond W. Garland, Sgt George A. George, PFC Oscar Gonzalez, CWO Jack W. Goodall, Maj. Theodore Gooding, SSgt Rex Gorman, PFC Eugene A. Gotta, Maj Thomas T. Grady, TSgt Edward F. Grayson, Jr., 1stLt Jack R. Grey, SSgt Robert H. Gunning, Capt Albert J. Gunther, 1stLt Robert T. Hanifin, Jr., 1stLt Donald R. Harris, Maj John E. Hays, MSgt Winford D. Hays, Sgt Clark G. Henry.

1stLt John R. Hinds, WO Wilfred D. Holdren, WO Herbert E. Hotchkiss, TSgt Clifford H. Hufford, 1stLt Frederick M. Humphrey, WO Harold F. James, 1stLt Manning T. Jeter, PFC Carl O. Johnson, Capt James D. Jordan, PFC Kenneth L. Kemmerer, Capt George W. King, Sgt Spencer E. Kirchman, PFC Donald I. Kjellman, Cpl Lorenzo A. Laloggia, Cpl Alden A. LeGrand, Capt Alan B. Lemlein, PFC Lind-

bergh Amyx, Sgt Frank W. Lischeski, Capt John B. Long, Maj Robert E. Lorigan.

Sgt Oral Martin, Sgt Richard L. Martson, Sgt Harold E. McIntire, Cpl Raymond G. Mendoza, 2dLt John H. Miller, Cpl Richard R. Morgan, PFC Theodore R. Morris, Sgt George E. Nanson, Cpl Pablo R. Navardo, PFC William P. Newcomb, Capt William J. Nichols, Jr., Maj Stanley S. Nicolay, 1stLt Edward J. Nooney, 2dLt James P. O'Connell, Capt Donald T. Olson, Maj Merlin R. Olson, Capt Walter E. Ottmer, MSgt Mario Paccioretti, Maj Francis F. Perry, Capt John F. Paul.

Sgt Dwight A. Potter, LtCol Bruce Prosser, 1stLt Mark A. Rainer, Jr., SSgt Harold J. Rappold, 1stLt William C. Redel, Sgt Robert L. Reisner, SSgt Raymond R. Richards, 1stLt Nye G. Rodes, Sgt Donald B. Rooke, PFC Joseph C. Rushlow, Maj John W. Russell, Cpl Edward L. Schafsteck, LtCol Albert H. Schierman, 1stLt Joseph A. Schimmenti, PFC Eugene Schlegel, Capt Harold G. Schrier, LtCol Robert L. Schreier, Maj Henry W. Seeley, Jr., Maj Nathan Segal.

Sgt Joe A. Segura, Capt Donald L. Shenaut, SSgt Elmer G. Sheppard, Maj Donald W. Sherman (2d), 1stLt Boyd B. Sibert, Jr., TSgt Stanley P. Sienski, Maj Frederick Simpson, PFC Herbert L. Smith, Maj Jefferson D. Smith, Jr., SSgt Luke C. Smith, Sgt Nathan H. Smith, 1stLt William L. Smith, TSgt Howard W. Solheim, Sgt Harry R. Spies, Maj Theodore F. Spiker, 2d Lt James W. Stemple, LtCol John W. Stevens, II, Cpl Charles E. Stewart, SSgt Henry H. Stewart, Maj Elwyn M. Stimson, 1stLt Charles H. Sullivan, PFC Joseph R. Sullivan.

Maj Richard E. Sullivan, PFC Berkley J. Summers, PFC Marcus Summers, Cpl Robert C. Temple, SSgt Norbert J. Theriot, 1stLt Frank C. Trumble, MSgt Fred L. Turner, 1stLt Robert A. Underwood, LtCol Ellsworth G. Van Orman (2d), Cpl Raymond M. Varella, SSgt Joseph V. Vismont, Maj William E. Vorhies, 1stLt John A. Wachter, PFC Thomas J. Wall, Maj Harold Wallace, Sgt Peter L. Walter, Sgt William F. Warner, 1stLt Calvin C. Watters, Cpl Loren E. Weilnau, SSgt Donald A. Wetherbee, Sgt Bryan K. White, Capt Bernard J. Whitelock, Cpl Elgin C. Williams, Jr., MSgt Leslie E. Williams, LtCol Ransom M. Wood, CWO Levi Woodbury, Cpl Robert C. Wright, and MSgt Joseph Wysocki.

Distinguished Flying Cross

1stLt William E. Androsko, Capt Victor A. Armstrong (3d), 1stLt Charles F. Baldwin, Jr., SSgt William E. Barnes, Capt Claude O. Barnhill, Jr., 1stLt Austin E. Brenneman, Cpl William O. Brennen, LtCol "J" F. Cole (2d), TSgt James E. Cole, 1stLt Harry W. Colmery, Capt Donald Conroy (2d and 3d), Capt Oliver W. Curtis, 1stLt Harold D. Daigh, 1stLt George H. Dodenhoff, Cpl Elwood D. Farra, Capt Howard J. Finn, Capt Charles D. Garber (1st and 2d), TSgt George W. Glauser, Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk, TSgt John F. Hart.

Capt Howard L. Hean, 1stLt Roland B. Heilman, MSgt Leroy E. Heimrick, Capt Harry G. C. Henneberger, Maj Robert P. Keller (1st and 2d), 1stLt Harold R. Knowles, 2dLt James W. Laseter, 1stLt William R. Lipscomb, Capt William J. Longfellow, 1stLt Gustave F. Lueddeke, Jr., 2dLt Billy C. Marks (3d), Capt George E. McClane, Capt Robert E. McClean, 1stLt Eugene Millette, 1stLt Robert W. Minick (1st and 2d), Capt Malcolm G. Moncrief, Jr.

2dLt Stanley J. Osserman, Capt Bertram L. Perkins, Capt Frank K. Reilly, Jr., Maj Kenneth L. Reusser, 1stLt Alvin R. Rieder, Capt Harry N. Schwendimann, Capt John Skoric, SSgt Delbert L. Stanley, 1stLt Frank H. Stratton (2d), TSgt Irving G. Taylor (2d), Capt James E. Warren, Jr., and Capt Wilbur D. Wilcox.

Air Medal

1stLt Jack A. Adam, PFC Peter J. Alcantar, LtCol Norman J. Anderson (8th and 9th), 1stLt William E. Androsko (3d), Capt Victor A. Armstrong (4th, 5th, and 6th), 1stLt John H. Barclay, Capt Claude O. Barnhill, Jr. (8th, 9th, and 10th), Cpl William B. Baugh, Jr., 1stLt Rocco D. Bianchi, Capt Hersel D. C. Blasingame (1st and 2d), 2dLt Aquilla M. Blaydes (4th and 5th), TSgt John P. Bodnar (1st and 2d), Sgt Henry O. Brawner (1st and 2d), 1stLt John Browne (1st and 2d), Capt Ernest A. Bufford, Jr. (5th and 6th), 1stLt Charles H. Burgans, Jr., Capt Earl P. Carey (7th).

TSgt Clyde B. Casebeer (2d and 3d), 1stLt Forrest E. Caudle, 1stLt Thomas J. Cochran (4th), 1stLt John W. Coffman, 2ndLt Doyle H. Cole (1st and 2d), LtCol "J" F. Cole (4th, 5th, and 6th), 1stLt Harry W. Colmery (2d and 3d), Cpl Harvey Cooper, Jr., Capt Ruel H. Corley, Jr., 1stLt Burton Y. Courchesne, 1stLt George H. Cullins, 1stLt Harold D. Daigh, 1stLt Richard S. Doth (3d and 4th), Cpl Tillford C. Downing (1st and 2d), Cpl Robert S. Duffy.

1stLt Patrick Dugan (12th), Cpl John D. Dulabahn, Capt Kenneth T. Dykes, Capt Howard Ferguson, Jr. (5th and 6th), Capt Howard J. Finn (19th), 1stLt Sidney Fisher (1st and 2d), PFC Gerald E. Flint, 1stLt Shelby M. Forrest, TSgt Martin I. Frederick, Sgt Manuel Frias, Jr. (1st and 2d), Capt Edward F. Ganschow (4th), Capt Charles D. Garber (3d and 4th), Capt Robert J. Graham (1st and 2d), 1stLt John L. Greene (1st and 2d), PFC Blanchard M. Guthrie, 1stLt Leslie R. Hail (3d), 1stLt William L. Hall (7th).

Capt William J. Halligan (1st and 2d), Sgt John H. Harvey, Capt Wesley W. Hazlett (9th), Capt Howard L. Hean (2d, 3d, and 4th), SSgt Alfred C. Heck, Capt Charles A. House (1st and 2d), Cpl Billy Howell, TSgt Rayburn A. Hudman, SSgt Clifford W. Hudson, TSgt Leo J. Ihli (1st and 2d), Capt James K. Johnson (5th and 6th), Maj Robert E. Johnson (1st and 2d), 1stLt Tracy N. Johnson (1st and 2d), Capt Joseph R. Kapsch (4th), Capt Joseph Keller (3d), Maj Robert P. Keller (9th), Capt John P. Kelley (6th and 7th), MSgt Wayne H. Kerr, Cpl Michael F. Kocieniewski, PFC Alex Kudlik.

Sgt Hal B. Landis, TSgt Gail Lane (6th), 2dLt James W. Laseter (2d, 3d, and 4th), 1stLt William R. Lipscomb (2d, 3d, and 4th), 2dLt Edward L. Lieland, Jr. (2d and 3d), Capt William J. Longfellow (3d and 4th), 1stLt Gustave F. Lueddeke, Jr. (3d and 4th), Maj Arnold A. Lund (8th and 9th), Maj William M. Lundin (19th), Sgt Joseph Malpigli (1st and 2d), PFC Thomas Massey, Jr., Sgt John E. Mattson, Capt George E. McClane (6th, 7th, and 8th), 1stLt Jerry L. McCollom (1st and 2d), 1stLt Harrison J. McCown, Sgt Eugene S. McGregor, Sgt John McGuire, Jr., Cpl Raymond K. McLeod (1st and 2d), Cpl Neil J. McNeill (1st and 2d), 1stLt Robert A. Meyer (2d and 3d), and PFC Obie M. Mitchell.






ACCURACY OF THE *M1*

By MSgt T. R. Mitchell

the M1 is a faster-shooting, but otherwise generally inferior, rifle than the old '03.

I have been in close association with marksmanship training of men selected for match competition. I have been a competitor and coach for several years. I have only been competing and coaching with the M1 since 1948. And it seems ironic to me that so many people are ready to accept any fallacious assumption that seems to make sense without first investigating the facts involved. For the record, the following is submitted.

The M1 rifle with which we are armed today will shoot well inside a 10-inch circle at 300 yards. And it is a proven fact that the M1 will shoot scores and groups




❖ WHY DOES THE GREATEST NATION IN THE WORLD USE a service rifle that doesn't shoot good enough to stay in a 10-inch circle at 300 yards? Why is accuracy sacrificed for fire power? Why don't shooters get the excellent scores with the M1 that used to be made with the 1903 service rifle? Why doesn't the service shoot at 1,000 yards instead of maximum ranges of 600 yards for matches and 500 yards qualification firing?

These questions have been asked again and again during the past several years and the answers, when forthcoming, have been varied. The fact that such questions have been asked indicates that something is wrong and it has been easy for the average Marine to assume that

which will almost equal those made by the famous 1903 Springfield, *provided* the same good ammunition which was once used in the Springfield can be obtained for use in the M1.

The scores made with the M1 rifle in the competition at Quantico in 1950 show that we are getting closer to the scores desired and that we will soon be ready to go back to 1000 yards instead of only 600 yards. In the Marine Corps Match that year such fine scores were made that it goes without saying that the score that won the match in 1946 would not have placed in 1950. At the Match it was not uncommon to hear such things as: "Well, Marines have finally learned to shoot the M1,"

The average Marine has generally accepted the idea that the M1 is faster-shooting but otherwise somewhat inferior to the old '03. The author, a distinguished rifleman with years of match shooting to his credit, says that this assumption is false



or "The armorers have learned to make the weapon more accurate."

These statements are not entirely supported by facts. Such conclusions were easy to reach because the 1950 Quantico scores were unusually high.

The main reason for the uniformly high scores in the 1950 Quantico matches points to the quality ammunition used and not so much that the armorers knew more or that the shooters were so much better. I know, for it was my responsibility to select and test all the ammunition used in the matches at Quantico in 1949 and 1950. The scores made during those years represented exactly what the ammunition was capable of doing. The practice of match-conditioning rifles is an important function and it should always be continued; however, no armorer can make a rifle perform better than the ammunition used.

To prove that ammunition is the main trouble, you only need to consult the scores of the Marine Corps Rifle Team for 1940. Both the 1903 and M1 were used. There is one exceptional score sheet from the 1940 Wakefield Matches, based on two-day averages. According to this sheet, 34 men fired the 1903 rifle over the National Match course and 14 men fired 16 rounds rapid-fire and 10 rounds at 600 yards and 1000 yards respectively with the M1. The averages compiled show that the three high men with the M1 had scores of 292.5, 289.5, and 288.6. They had a 10-shot average of 49, 46, and 48 respectively at 1000 yards. The three high men with the 1903 rifle averaged 290.5, 289.5, and 288.6 with a 10-shot average of 48.8, 47.8, and 48.2 respectively at 1000 yards. These scores were made with National Match ammunition, which is only a good lot of service ammunition selected and made available for the National

Matches. On another day, firing National Match ammunition, the top ranking three M1 riflemen made 49, 48, 48 respectively for 10 rounds at 1000 yards. Scores made with the M1 at Camp Perry in 1940 were characterized as good to excellent.

If the scores of the 1940 matches, where both rifles were used, are not available to you, get a few rounds of pre-war ammunition and go to the range and prove the point for yourself. If you can't get the ammunition, then see some reliable handloader and he will make up almost any kind of a load that will beat the service load. By this I do not mean to imply that today's service ammunition is of uniformly poor quality. It is inferior in most cases to the ammunition that we used to have for match shooting before the last war.

The high scores fired at Quantico in 1950 may make it look as though we have the ammunition situation licked. It took only 18 lots of ammunition with extensive tests from the shoulder and a machine rest to find one lot of ammunition that would shoot a 20-inch circle at 600 yards. This proves just one thing: you cannot expect a rifle to shoot any better than the ammunition you are shooting. The performance will be no better than that of a plane that uses a different octane-count fuel each day of flight.

As I recall it, most individual comments after the 1940 matches in regard to making the M1 rifle a better match weapon called for installing a smaller aperture sight with finer adjustments. There were no serious comments made concerning the accuracy of the M1 and I believe at that time most M1 shooters took it for granted that we had a good combat weapon that was capable of making good scores.

When it comes to making a match weapon of the M1, there isn't much to be done other than to check the technical points according to present instruction. Most of the work done by armorers to the M1 rifle adds little




to the performance of the weapon. In fact, I am inclined to believe that we sometimes do more harm than good.

Now to answer the question "Why don't we have as good ammunition as we had 10 years ago?" We have gone through some trying times during the last 10 years and it looks like we may have some more trying times in the future. Our methods of production have speeded up and in many cases I am inclined to believe that we sacrificed one thing to accomplish another. In regard to this, the last war seemed to require fire power, along with quantity of ammunition, instead of pin-point accuracy. We also started to use armor piercing ammunition in greater amounts. These things may be the cause of our losing some of our fine accuracy in service ammunition.

It appears that armor piercing ammunition is here to stay for combat, qualification, and in some cases, match shooting. Regardless of what the ammunition is to be used for, there must be one thing taken into consideration—accuracy. With the technical know-how of this great country, service ammunition should have the best in a simple little thing like a projectile for a .30 caliber cartridge.

I would like to point out that I, like most rifle and



pistol shooters, am primarily interested in obtaining higher scores and I am always looking for something that will make those fine scores without putting out more than the required effort. In this respect, for those not familiar with service rifles and ammunition, I would like to emphasize that our service ammunition is not inferior ammunition. Although this article is critical of our present service ammunition, it must be remembered that I am speaking of super accuracy that ordinarily is not expected of the standard service rifle with standard service ammunition. Please don't write your congressman and tell him that your son or husband is going to be using inferior ammunition against our present or future enemies.

☛ AS FAR AS THE M1 RIFLE IS CONCERNED, you don't have to do much worrying. Let us do as much to the M1, technically speaking, as was done to the 1903 rifle and the results will be surprisingly close. The main thing is to insure good shooting by obtaining good ammunition.

The whole situation could be helped with a testing ground similar to the pre-war National Matches at Perry and by using safe match ammunition in all stages except those matches that require service ammunition.

Our taxpayers could save a lot of money in the long run on repairs, wear, and breakage, if the services used ammunition with a good non-corrosive primer. I might add that I believe in some cases a life could be saved if non-corrosive primers were used. Also, it would be wise to discontinue the use of armor piercing ammunition for practice due to the fast rate of wear on barrels.

☛ THESE THINGS and more must be considered in order to have accuracy with prolonged fire power. Until some improvements are made we should take better care of our small arms.

There is no question that the M1 is a good rifle. From



my own experience and from observing other distinguished riflemen, I must conclude that the technique used with the 1903 rifle is equally applicable to the M1 for

slow fire. For rapid fire, I believe that a tighter sling and a more rigid position are required, for the courses of today and the future seem to indicate that we fire more rapidly within a shorter time limit. I also believe that it is necessary to follow through on each shot with the M1 even more than with the 1903 rifle. This will certainly apply to all so-called "snap" shooters, due to the minimum trigger pull of four and a half pounds and in some cases a slower hammer fall.

Most 1903 shooters will find that shooting the M1 is like learning all over again, especially in firing rapid fire. The main thing is not to become disgusted over your M1 shooting without giving yourself and some good match ammunition a fair test. In fact, the new shooters will master the M1 rifle faster than we older ones did the 1903. The M1 is easy to shoot and it is accurate. US ☛ MC



Let's Kick It Around Again



Shore party at work at Guam, where "cherry pickers" were used to lift supplies over reef into tractors.

LtCol Lloyd G. Coutts

THE TERM "SHORE PARTY" MEANS SOMETHING TO A few, confusion to the majority, and nothing to the rest. It forms a varying mental picture to the majority—something similar to the fable of the blind men describing the elephant. To some, the shore party is pictured as a small group of strong backs and replacements; to others, who might have gotten mixed up with it for no reason of their own, it resembles a tremendous engineering organization composed of nearly one-fifth of the division. Mental concepts will vary from assault engineers to stevedores, from base maintenance personnel to naval units. To add to this confused mental state, the name of the shore party organization has not only been changed time and again, but its size and internal organization have been altered to the extent that even those who thought they knew something about it draw a blank at times. We've had separate pioneer battalions within the division, pioneer battalions as a part of a composite engineer regiment, then back to separate pioneer battalions; then the name was changed and we had a shore party battalion, a shore party regiment, and at present a shore party battalion.

To wrap it all up and tie it in a nicely confused package, we keep what the shore party is supposed to do, its operational procedures and techniques, classified **CONFIDENTIAL**.

Has the shore party been pushed and kicked around because its capabilities and limitations have at times not been fully realized, or could it be that the shore party organization has been misplaced as an organic part of the Marine Division?

Let's examine the mission of the shore party and see what it is supposed to do. (We can't be specific—confidential, you know.) The most important part of the shore party's mission, if rephrased, would go something like this: To support the landing force or any of its elements by unloading supplies and equipment ashore during an amphibious operation at the right time and at the right place and in such condition that troops engaged in capturing the beachhead would have whatever they need at all times in order to defeat the enemy. To shorten it a little: To provide close logistic support for the landing force during an amphibious operation. From the mission, then, we can gather that the shore party (1) exists for the

purpose of an amphibious operation, and (2) is a logistical or service operating agency. Let's leave the shore party mission briefly and see what the division has in the way of supporting service type organizations.

In order to provide the division with the necessary logistic support the following service organizations are made organic to it: a service battalion, a medical battalion, an ordnance battalion, a motor transport battalion, and a shore party battalion. A signal battalion and an engineer battalion are also capable of rendering certain logistic services for the division. Each of the above organizations named, with the exception of one, can perform its primary mission in support of the division without having to be augmented or reinforced. The one exception is our football, the shore party battalion.

The shore party battalion within the division is not organized or equipped, as a battalion organization, to carry out the mission of providing close logistic support to the division as a shore party. Its concept, as organized, is to provide only an engineer type nucleus, containing command and control elements around which an operational shore party task organization is formed.

Let's see how our shore party battalion would be formed into an operational shore party under certain operating conditions; for example, when the division is conducting an amphibious operation within logistic supporting distance of higher echelon service agencies, the division shore party (task organization) would be formed, of necessity, from those service organizations organic to the division and such combat troops as the division could spare. Such an organization would be capable of rendering limited shore party support to the division.

Here is a more frequent example. The division is con-

ducting an amphibious operation at a distance beyond which higher echelon service agencies can effectively support it. The division shore party (task organization) will be formed not only by some augmentation from within the division, but will also require considerable additional supporting attachments from higher service echelons in order to carry out effective shore party support.

From the above, then, it would appear that the shore party battalion organic to the division not only exists for the purpose of an amphibious operation and is a logistical operating agency, but also, that it must be tailor-made in the form of a task organization in order to accomplish its mission for each particular landing operation. Further, that to be effective as a division shore party, it would require not only some augmentation from service elements organic to the division, but would require, in most cases, considerable reinforcements from higher echelon service agencies.

Now that we have a little background as to where the service elements of the division level fit in with the shore party, let us take a look at the service organizations in a higher echelon.

There is contained within the structure of each Fleet Marine Force a Service Command. This Service Command is designed solely for the purpose of providing logistic support for all tactical elements of the Fleet Marine Force operating in the field when and where such services are required. The tactical elements of the Fleet Marine Force may include, of course, commands as large as an amphibious corps, division, or any tactical element of the division.

In order to provide close logistic support for Marine divisions operating independently, or as part of a larger force, during an amphibious operation, we have within Service Command a higher flexible mobile service organization which bears the title of Combat Service Group. This organization, during wartime and when in a non-operational status, is composed only of an administrative headquarters or nucleus. To form an effective operating combat service group it is necessary to attach to the nucleus certain required service units and organization from within Service Command. The number and type of attachments will depend

Beach landing scene at Wonsan, Korea. Absence of enemy in beachhead area facilitated orderly and rapid unloading.



on the logistical support requirements of the operation.

The facts gleaned from the above show a combat service group to be: (1) A logistical operating agency; (2) an organization capable of providing logistic support to tactical elements during an amphibious operation; (3) a nucleus requiring the formation of a task organization in order to operate.


The words "logistical operating agency," "support of an amphibious operation," and "task organization," have been used to describe both the shore party organization and combat service group. The difference lies in the fact that the combat service group is capable of providing logistic support for tactical elements in the field and for landing operations; whereas the shore party is designed only for providing logistic support for landing operations. One additional feature of combat service group is that, although it is in itself a task organization, elements for it will normally be employed as augmentation for the division shore party. Confusing? Yes, but only because there appears to be an overlapping or duplication of effort in providing the division with the necessary logistic support for an amphibious operation.

Let's boil it all down and see what we have. To start off with, we have the shore party battalion organic to the division existing for an amphibious operation and requiring augmentation from higher service echelons in order to operate effectively as a shore party.

Next, we have a combat service group located in Service Command, Fleet Marine Force, which, when formed into a task organization provides close logistic support to Marine divisions conducting amphibious operations. Finally, we have those service elements from combat service group which will be required to augment the division shore party.

One of two things becomes readily apparent: First, that our Marine divisions have an organic service agency (shore party battalion) which cannot be efficiently employed at all times for its intended purpose; second that Service Command does not have all the service elements it requires to provide Marine divisions with effective logistic support during amphibious operations.

World War II has been called a war of supplies. The Marine Corps foresaw the need for increased efficiency in providing logistic support during an amphibious opera-



tion prior to World War II. This was done early in the war by the rapid formation of a task organization which was to provide the necessary link in our amphibious supply chain. As the problem became an increasingly larger problem, many developments and with them the creation and refinement of shore party techniques. Each amphibious operation formulated and advanced the shore party's procedures of operation.

Today we possess well developed shore party techniques based on practical experience. Although our amphibious logistical and shore party doctrines have been advanced considerably by World War II, they are still in the adolescent stage. There are still many questions to be answered and problems to be solved.

During the last war we saw the Marine Corps with six operating divisions, each division having a shore party battalion organic to it. Could we not have provided the same shore party support to these divisions with less? How many divisions will the Corps have in a future war or even during our present expansion program? Can we, as in the last war, afford the specialist personnel and large numbers of equipment required by a shore party battalion for each division whether or not the division is participating in an amphibious operation? Can we afford to allow our divisions, by themselves, to carry all the weight of the logistical problems involved in shore party operations?

In order to present a possible solution and to present some food for thought, let's kick the shore party again. Let's take the shore party battalion out of division and place it under Service Command and see how it would work. (Diagram A, above)

From the diagram it is evident that the shore party would come under the Service Command, Fleet Marine Force, and be placed in a combat service category. The shore party would be organized as a highly trained and well equipped nuclear organization, drawing its operating strength from Service Command elements. The size and organization of the shore party units could, in general, remain as they now exist within our Marine divisions (nuclear organizations.) The number of such shore party units required during wartime expansion would not be based entirely on the number of organized divisions but on the number and size of planned amphibious operations.

The formation of a service organization to support a division during an amphibious operation would result by the attachment of those necessary Service Command elements (including a shore party unit or units) to a combat service group nucleus. Thus, one might say that the ability of both Service Command and a combat service group to carry out their mission (to provide logistic support to tactical organizations during a landing operation) would be "un fait accompli."

An operational shore party would be developed with, and from a part of, the overall combat service group task organization. In other words, those service elements required to build an operational shore party would be attached to a shore party unit (nucleus). The shore party organization formed would then become one of the operating service agencies of a combat service group.

Division, under this set-up, would be required to place certain of its organic service elements within a combat service group attachment. These elements would assist in providing continuity of effort during the initial landing and beach build-up.

Under this set-up shore party training would be accomplished in two ways. First, we would have the required specialist training of the shore party nuclei, this phase of training to be carried out within Service Command during periods between operations and prior to the commencement of the second phase. The second phase would consist of operational training, the training of the entire shore party task organization just prior to an operation—this phase to be conducted under the control of and with the tactical organization that the shore party or combat service group is supporting.

The length of time required for the shore party to conduct operational training as part of, say, a division, would depend to a great extent upon the degree of simplicity or complexity of the operation and the time required by the division shore party to obtain a working knowledge of the tactical and logistical plans. The overall operational training time should be reduced from what has been and is being required at present to train an effective division shore party.

Now let's take a look at the "pay off stage," the landing and beach organization, to see how the shore party would fit into the picture. Our present shore party operating procedures and techniques would not require any apparent modification or change, nor would shore party operational titles as set forth in present doctrines need changing. From diagram B we see that shore party elements during the BLT-RCT and initial division phase of the operation are performing their normal mission of providing logistic support for tactical organizations. The shore party elements, with the appropriate service attachments, are now capable of controlling the issuance of supplies from beach dumps along with other services, thus establishing a shore party "service" area.

During the initial division phase, with the advance of the tactical organizations and the continued echeloning into the beach area of additional combat service group elements, organic division service units are capable of moving inland and establishing a division service area. These service units are now free to perform their normal mission of providing logistic support to their parent division operating in the field.

Also, at this time, the forward echelon of the combat service group headquarters will come ashore to effect centralized control of shore party units operating the beaches. A division shore party headquarters, as such, would not be required. Its functions of controlling and coordinating the operating shore parties would now be assumed by the combat service group headquarters.

THE DIVISION PHASE finds the majority of service units of combat service group ashore and operating. With their arrival ashore, the responsibility of supply and maintenance services has been shifted from the shore party and consolidated, for efficiency of operation, into a service area. The shore party can now devote its attention to the operation of the shore party area and the main task of unloading supplies and equipment. All functions within the beach support area will be controlled and coordinated under one headquarters, that of combat service group. Thus, essential continuity of logistic effort will be realized during the critical assault phase.

The base or garrison phase brings about the relief of the assault shore party units. This relief is accomplished gradually, without loss of effort, by the planned echeloning into the beach area of relieving garrison personnel and equipment. Depending on the dictates of the operation, combat service group elements, less the shore party nucleus, would continue to furnish close logistic support to the division. The shore party nucleus would revert to the control of Service Command, Fleet Marine Force, for rehabilitation, training, and future employment.

Since an operational shore party organization consists of both military and naval personnel, we should consider

how our "kick" of the shore party battalion would effect the naval elements.


The naval component of the shore party—"beach party"—is formed, by the requirements of an operation, from a naval beach group. Naval beach groups are commissioned organizations within the Navy's amphibious forces. They are designed to provide the landing force (shore party) with necessary naval control and support elements. The number of such naval beach groups, organized within the amphibious forces, is dependent upon the number and extent of planned or anticipated amphibious operations. Also, like the shore party units, the beach party elements would normally be relieved and withdrawn after the assault phase of an operation. Our "kick" then, would have no apparent effect on the shore party naval elements, but would be placing the shore party units in a similar position and status as their working partners.

Taking up peacetime operation next, with the "musts" of economy, we find that the shore party units under Service Command would operate in a similar capacity as the combat service group; that is, in close proximity to and with our existing divisions. Again, no change need be made.

IN CONNECTION with our latest concepts on amphibious operations, the employment of helicopter and/or airborne troops, let's see how our shore party units under higher echelon would fit into the picture. The high degree of flexibility afforded these units under Service Command, particularly in equipment and organization, would make them readily adaptable for employment as "air supply parties." As such, they would be capable of rendering service support along the lines for which they were originally organized; that is, supply control, movement, handling, and evacuation. These services would be accomplished not only at the "Departure Base" or "Loading Zone" but also during the assault phase of the operation in the "Forward Landing Areas."

Since we are striving for results let us see what our "kick" would accomplish. A shore party nuclear type organization under Service Command, FMF, would:

1. Result in economy of personnel—engineer, shore party, administration, and motor transport.
2. Result in economy of equipment—engineer, signal, and motor transport.
3. Provide the Fleet Marine Force with a highly trained efficient organization by allowing for standardization of operating procedures and techniques.
4. Allow for continued improvement and advancement of equipment and its operating techniques.
5. Allow for increased flexibility in the forming of a shore party task organization (to include the



forming of a service organization for helicopter and airborne operation.)

6. Provide overall coordinated logistic effort in support of landing force organizations.
7. Allow for the expedient echelonment ashore of supporting service agencies.
8. Decrease tactical organizations' logistic problems.
9. Decrease the time required to train an effective operational shore party organization.
10. Not require any great change in the present shore party organization, its mission or operating procedures.

To make sure we are facing in the right direction the following is quoted from a portion of a recent concept on the Fleet Marine Forces logistic organization:

The Service Command exists for the sole purpose of relieving tactical commanders of most of the details incident to the logistical support of the forces operating in the field. This permits tactical organizations to devote a greater share of their time and energy to operational problems, and at the same time, centralizes a large share of logistical problems within an organization which can devote its entire effort to their solution.

Has our kick furthered and strengthened this concept?

USMC

The Genesis of FMF Doctrine: 1879-1899

By W. H. Russell

PART III

"... a balanced force ..."

☛ LAST MONTH IN THIS SERIES WE SAW HOW ALL THE important elements of amphibious doctrine had been formally presented by 1888. But there was one big question that article did not answer — Why did it take so long to work out the coordinated assault?

The answer, of course, is that old Devil technology; or more specifically, steam. The coming of steam to naval vessels back in 1837 provoked radical change both ashore and afloat. There could be no sound strategic or tactical doctrine until reforms induced by steam had time to jell, and in 1888 the jelling process had just begun.

The Issue

☛ THE NAVAL ACADEMY was founded in 1845 to cope with steam. By 1870 it was turning out officers fit to take on all phases of the problem. Also in 1845, steam produced the bureau system. That octopus with active arms was complete in only the most limited sense, for it had no professional head to weigh and coordinate conflicting bureau policies. As a result, our Navy of the 1880s and '90s had exceptionally able officers, almost fatally handicapped because their pyramid of command lacked a capstone.

Afloat, steam had undermined the command relationship that was England's greatest contribution. The efficient secret of a line officer under sail had been his complete control of both motive and fighting power. Removing sails took away the instrument through which he had powered the ship, drilled her crew, and confirmed his own authority. The seaman under sail (like today's aircraft pilot) belonged to a special race performing unique duties. Both line officer and deck seaman felt about

steam as will the flier toward guided missiles that tie him to a desk.

Adm David Dixon Porter summed up the problem neatly in 1870. He wrote, "Up to the year 1846 we possessed ... the finest body of seamen in the world. ... At about ... the first introduction of steam ... deterioration in the crews of ships could be perceived ... our seamen were transformed into ... coal heavers, our officers had little to do but walk the deck. ..."

Line officers of the 1870s and '80s were not content as mere deck-walkers. A great many worked in the technical bureaus designing new ships, new ordnance, and creating new industries to build them. A few evolved doctrine for the new Navy, but the majority simply tried to make the new gear work. The task of converting experimental material into a fighting fleet appalled younger officers of the sea-going line. They began to press the technical bureaus for better ships — and quickly.

The bureau system greatly complicated the problem, and its truncated cone of command embittered both factions. Men in each camp agreed with Lt T. B. M. Mason that "battle is what we most desire to be prepared for," but every group prepared for a different battle in its own time and way.

Design held priority in the technical bureaus. Constructors, ordnance specialists, and engineers wanted a Navy accommodated to their needs. The nation, they said, must not contemplate policies their material could not support. The sea-going line was blinded by the job of training men who had to live beside boilers, coal ship, or work in the torrid engine room. Yet they wanted the speed and mobility of steam, and the firepower of new guns, without changing the ancient customs for using men at sea. Neither group had much patience with new doctrine that seemed merely to complicate the problem.

The Navy's bureau system of the 1880s resembled an octopus without a head. In the absence of a coordinating superior, the bureaus fought for control of naval policy, temporarily shelving ideas of a balanced landing force integral with the fleet

At first, each faction appealed to the doctrine of simplicity; then emotion took hold, and the majority confused simplicity with convenience. In its elementary form, the issue boiled down to a struggle between the technical bureaus and the Bureau of Navigation (representing the sea-going line) to control naval policy.



Without a professional superior to resolve the issue, there could be but one answer. The younger sea officers simply hung on until they were senior enough to arrange things their own way — which is probably how conservatives are made.

"Practical" officers had just bested bureau "theorists" when the new amphibious doctrine threatened their cherished autonomy. As long as the pioneers had simply needed technical Bureaus, "practical" men classified amphibious work as merely radical. But when "theoretical" amphibians pushed on to conclusions that affected shipboard routine, men afloat began to call them heretics.

The transition from radical hypothesis to heresy is still faintly perceptible. Had the pioneers simply marked in broad outlines of their doctrine, there would have been no trouble. For even a provisional squadron could provide a minimum of preliminary training, parallel command gunfire support, boats, troops, tactical formations, and brief logistic support. But the amphibians were not content with a mere minimum. They saw that no foundation is better than the structure it supports; a naval brigade improvised from the ship's complement of men and equipment could not stand against trained troops. It was clear that a truly effective landing force, integral with the fleet, must be a balanced force. And integrating the balanced land component with balanced supporting units implied changes afloat as well as ashore. Seeking those changes led the pioneers into heresy, and deprived the amphibious operation of support by a whole generation of line officers.

Balance, then, was their big problem, just as it is our own. It is an easy term to roll on the tongue, but holds different meaning for butcher, judge, and fighting man. In the military sense, a balanced force is the sum of parts so well coordinated that each lifts a share of their joint burden. Analysts test military balance by studying the parts of an operation that require maximum coordination. Weakness in amphibious balance shows quickly in shore party support, the ship-to-shore movement, or the tactical performance of troops ashore. As the amphibians came to understand the implications of their

→ In the space of a century, the Navy changed from sail to sail-and-steam, and then steam. Says the author: "removing sails took away the instrument through which [the line officer] powered the ship, drilled her crew, and confirmed his own authority." As the line officer became accustomed to steam, theoretical amphibians posed new problems that threatened to upset shipboard routine.



early doctrine, they pressed for real changes in those three areas. The harder they pressed, the more they antagonized their brothers afloat.

Radical Hypotheses

☛ SEVERAL OF THE AMPHIBIOUS PIONEERS saw the need for improving the movement of supplies over the beach after troops had landed. As Lt A. C. Dillingham expressed it, "The question of maintaining supply is a vital one, and a neglect of this would cause failure."

From his desk at the Office of Naval Intelligence, Ensign W. L. Rodgers had studied the amphibious record of the world's navies. He sensed the combat loading problem, and wanted bulk stores on each ship broken down into packages convenient for man-handling through the surf. Lt C. T. Hutchins supported him, but went a step further. He suggested improvising rafts for well-packed stores that did not break down easily.

Rodgers also put his finger on the fatal weakness of shore party organization—the beachmaster. He would have attached a beachmaster firmly to every naval brigade, instead of letting him dangle between brigade and squadron. In a full-strength brigade, Rodgers continued, the beachmaster should have about 200 boat-keepers, supplemented by at least two companies of men from the fleet, to land supplies and organize them. In addition, Rodgers wanted about 40 officers and men placed under the brigade quartermaster and commissary to supervise movement of supplies from beach to brigade, with actual labor furnished by company work parties dragging artillery limbers. Thus, Rodgers advocated sending ashore some 300 officers and men to land and organize the supplies for 1,500 combat effectives.

Hutchins had been with the combined amphibious force at Alexandria, Egypt, in 1882. Its experience so far from home bases convinced him that every amphibious squadron was "sadly in need of transport vessels. . . . After the landing . . . the vessels could be used as a base of supplies and for hospitals."

Each of these reforms in the field of supply was sound

in theory, and practical when viewed by men sent ashore for several days; but all of them ran counter to century-old ship routine or command doctrine. The atmosphere was so charged with emotion that deck officers, who demanded a break with custom for the sake of more efficient ships, vigorously opposed amphibians seeking balanced support for the landing force. And tension



RAdm S. B. Luce

built up steadily as the pioneers shifted their attention from logistic support to the combat itself.

In 1886 Maj James Forney and 1stLt L. W. T. Waller briefly brought the Marine Corps into the amphibious discussion. Forney believed that "three large depots should be established at Mare Island, Philadelphia, and Norfolk, where at least 500 men should be stationed. . . ." Waller advocated a single "central depot [that] should be made a school of instruction for officers and men" who will form landing forces. The following year Lt D. H. Mahan supplemented the Forney-Waller scheme by suggesting a permanent naval brigade commander, presumably in charge of the training base and instantly available in an emergency.

To remedy confusion in the 1887 North Atlantic Squadron exercises, that he believed came from improvising the entire operation at its landing point, Dillingham suggested that:

It would add much to the efficiency of our drills . . . if we had some permanent place where all the equipment necessary for the Naval Brigade could be kept. Here the squadron could assemble . . . for . . . drills or operations on shore. . . ."

Such advance base training would certainly have improved the ship-to-shore movement in the late '80s, but ultimate success hinged on the kind of boats available and the way they were used. And there again was a touchy problem. Though graceful (and fast in smooth water), the Navy pulling boat turned awkward in heavy sea or surf. It simply was not built for amphibious work.

Many senior officers had tried to remedy the situation. RearAdm S. B. Luce brought a French barge back from Europe, and in 1882 the Board of Inspection and Survey tested it, along with two Selfridge boats and other experimental models. The following year Adm Porter begged the Secretary to adopt a Herreshoff steam launch. "Why," he asked, "could we not have a boat of similar character for the general service, instead of the present heavy, clumsy, and unseaworthy launches that continue to be built for the Navy?"

☛ PERHAPS MORE RECENT ADVOCATES of improved boats should feel comforted. Even the combined effort of our Navy's leading seaman and its admiral, could not break down the hedge of custom. Things got no better, and four years later we hear D. H. Mahan complain that "our present boats are not fit for a first class navy. . . . Why, with the new ships, can we not have a new style of steam launch, pulling cutter, and light pulling life boat?"

That is a question amphibious experts have asked ever since. But there has been progress, for now most of the boats used in an operation have similar characteristics, and each unit uses them in the same way.

In 1888 the bugbear of simplicity unbalanced even a

careful ship-to-shore movement. Each company sent ashore came from a single shipboard division, so the executive officer insisted that it use divisional boats. Thus, mobility of each company in the ship-to-shore movement was tied to the men's routine boat duty. A company with two sections might boat them in a slow, heavy cutter and a light, fast lifeboat. Skirmishers might use the ship's heaviest boat, with the lightest going to a unit of the reserve.

The same doctrine of administrative simplicity led to the practice of loading all equipment contributed by each ship into her assault boats. Thus, reserve ammunition, rations, stoves, tentage, tools, and extra beach hands all crowded in with the fighting men. Dillingham spoke out strongly against the practice. He wanted fighters only in the assault boats, with spare gear carried ashore later in steam launches — "the most rapid means of communication between the shore . . . and squadron."

D. H. Mahan had a suggestion that offset the launch's tendency to ground too far out. "Cannot our whale boats," he asked, "be . . . rigged . . . as pontoons . . . with two whale boats a bridge 30 feet long and 10 feet wide can be erected. Such an arrangement . . . would be of much service where the sea is not too rough. . . . These whale boats should be manned by . . . artisans . . . to repair damages to fighting boats."

Sea officers had objected mildly when amphibians asked for balanced shore party support, and for advance base training. But this pressure for a balanced ship-to-shore movement was irritating. Questioning boat design and doctrine raised the emotional wall between "practical" men and "theorists." Had there been an objective professional superior, differences like these might have been constructive. As it was, they simply nursed along a conflict that burst into the open when the amphibious planners sought a balanced landing force.

Heresy

THE CONCEPT of a balanced landing force was not new, for it was Mason's emphasis on balance in the first amphibious paper that had attracted so many of the pioneers to the problem. Military study abroad and personal observation during the 1873 Panama expedition convinced Mason that the Navy must add trained riflemen to its artillery landing parties. "Only infantry," he wrote, "can decide battles and secure the ground won. . . . Riflemen must be opposed by riflemen."

Lt John C. Soley agreed generally with Mason. Yet his experience as a flag lieutenant at several practice landings revealed to him the special nature of an amphibious operation. Where Mason tended to swallow Army doctrine whole, Soley pressed for riflemen strongly reinforced by artillery. He said, "Our artillery is more nearly allied to the infantry and is infantry but with a different

arm. . . ." Without realizing it, Soley coined a phrase that applies to every arm reinforcing infantry, including tactical aircraft.

Fulfillment of the Mason-Soley doctrine meant a balanced tactical unit, but that required either reorganizing the ship or finding riflemen elsewhere. Otherwise, no landing force integral with the fleet could attain true balance. A. T. Mahan's earliest contribution to amphibious doctrine lay in his urging the practical difficulties that keep any ship from landing a balanced unit of reinforced riflemen. Ships simply were not organized that way. Before 1889 few suggested finding riflemen elsewhere, because (in a Navy without type forces) they could not have been integral with the fleet. It was a nice dilemma. But the amphibians had faith in their doctrine. As soon as it matured, they began to press for a balanced tactical unit.

In 1886 Lt C. G. Calkins spoke out against the overemphasis on landing unsupported guns. Lt Hutchins warned that, "Too many guns should not be landed, as they hinder the movements of a force and are always a heavy burden. . . . It would seem far better to land a few [mobile] guns. . . ." Dillingham asked for tactical doctrine that posted guns in close support of infantry. Cmdr William Bainbridge-Hoff went even further; he wanted Gatling guns considered as an infantry arm, not part of the artillery. D. H. Mahan amplified the Hoff proposal. He pressed for a machine gun company attached to each triangular infantry battalion, plus regularly organized artillery support.

These were radical doctrines for the day. In 1886 no more than three ships of our Navy could boat a battalion landing force strong enough to justify its name. Those three were the only ships that carried divisions strong enough to raise a sound infantry or artillery company. Throughout the rest of the fleet, the terms *brigade*, *battalion*, and *company* had meaning peculiar to our Navy.

The smallest tactical unit of the landing force was a *section*; 16 men, one petty officer, and one officer all drawn from the same shipboard division. All sections were trained as both infantry and artillery. The usual artillery company had a single piece manned by one section; two sections from the same division (commanded by the division officer) formed a standard infantry company. Three infantry companies, reinforced by one artillery company, formed a full-strength battalion landing force — the largest unit a single ship could send ashore. Two or more battalion landing forces acting together



Adm D. D. Porter

formed a naval brigade. In 1887 our Navy's largest battalion landing force had about the strength of a German infantry company reinforced with a small field piece. The maximum naval brigade one of our squadrons could land that year was equivalent to a standard European battalion (about 1,200 rifles) reinforced by some 12 guns.

With only three ships able to boat real battalions or companies, it was extremely difficult to build the table of organization for a naval brigade without violating the customary rule that all officers and men of a single company must come from the same division.

LtCmdr C. H. Stockton, Bainbridge-Hoff and Rodgers each had a try at it. They seemed to rely on sound organization, good leadership, and the seaman's innate adaptability; for each proposed an organization table based on the standard infantry company — 32 rank, two file, three officers. The practical officers raised no objection, because a company of that size put no strain on the ship or its routine.

Hutchins saw that a company of only 32 rifles was useless on the beach, so he tried to hedge. His table called for a battalion landing force of two expanded infantry companies (each with 40 rank, four file, three officers), reinforced by a standard artillery unit. Hutchins' plan conformed to the custom of drawing the entire company from a single division, but in all save the largest ships it left too few men aboard.

Lt W. P. Clason and Calkins were bolder. They mixed men from two separate divisions (each section came from a single division) to form companies with 72 rank and file led by three officers. But they hedged at the landing force level by limiting a battalion to two companies in which the commander must substitute machine gun for rifle sections to meet local conditions.

❖ DESPITE THEIR VARIATIONS, each of those organization tables conformed to the customs of its time. There was no demand that the ship be organized to suit the battalion, no suggestion of a special type force built around the rifleman, and no hint that the restrictions completely neutralized any infantry force that obeyed them. A 16-man section was the base of each table, and four was their smallest tactical unit. Every one of the companies could use the standard infantry manual prepared by Maj Gen Emory Upton, USA, and adopted in 1867 (when Upton was 27). But for all their ingenuity in adjusting infantry to ship routine, not one of those companies was practical ashore.

The irresistible force had met the immovable body. There must be some change in the customary organization of naval personnel, or the landing force would go the way of sails. As Col S. B. Griffith, USMC, expressed it recently, the amphibious field needed a heretic and

could not wait long for him to emerge. Fortunately, he was already at hand in the person of Lt D. H. Mahan.

The Navy officer who saw most clearly into infantry tactics is still an obscure figure, overshadowed by a well-known father and a famous brother. The father was Dennis Hart Mahan, West Point graduate and America's first home-grown military scientist. As a teacher at the Point from the late 1820s and dean of its faculty for 31 years, Professor Mahan trained scores of officers prominent in both Mexican and Civil Wars. His eldest son, Alfred Thayer Mahan, blossomed after 1890 as the first great philosopher of naval war. The Professor's youngest son bore his father's name, but did not use the term junior. He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1869, and held routine billets interspersed with military study abroad at his own expense. While teaching at the Academy in 1888, he sent the Naval Institute *Proceedings* a revolutionary article* that struck at the root of the amphibious problem.

❖ THE YOUNGEST MAHAN recognized a cleavage between tactical development in the United States and Europe. We were still tied to command doctrines of Frederick the Great that insist on complete control of an entire action by the senior officer in tactical command. Abroad, military men were moving toward flexibility, individual initiative, and downward delegation of tactical decision. D. H. Mahan saw that our landing forces must fail if they adhered to conventional doctrine, or used Upton's restrictive *Tactics*.

Upton required absolute combat control by a company commander, who gave all firing orders to men in rigidly dressed lines. His squad unit (two ranks of four) always changed front by wheeling, never by marching to the rear.

Skirmishers trying to apply Upton's doctrine in amphibious assault must form a double line as soon as they hit the beach, count off by fours, and deploy by the numbers at their captain's command. In the advance they must hold regular intervals, and could not use cover unless halted as a unit. Even then, the manual demanded a straight line, so cover had to accommodate the entire line or go unused.

If skirmishers were gritty enough to succeed under such artificial control, the main body could not land in their support until the beachhead permitted full deployment of the battalion in line. The unit of four was so basic that, even after a skirmish line was reinforced to replace losses, its senior officer had to form the men in line before he could begin any orderly movement.

Lt Mahan saw the ship-to-shore movement as the heart

*"Three Considered as a Tactical Unit," #14 (1-2) 1888, pp. 343-362.

of amphibious work, and he knew that assault troops tied to Upton's doctrine must fail against real opposition. Since our national policy had given the Navy an amphibious mission, he proposed shipboard drill and training that would produce effective naval riflemen. The shipboard division, he said, must be large enough to supply a wartime infantry company of 108 rank, nine file, and three officers; training schedules must send them ashore until they mastered the European doctrine. Above all, the monolithic battalion controlled by a single senior officer must go.

The foundation of D. H. Mahan's force was a tactical group of three men who began to fight as a unit the instant they hit the beach. As soon as three units of three got ashore, there was a section led by a petty officer; three sections made a squad, three squads a company, three companies a battalion, three battalions a regiment, and so on (Mahan said) as far as one chose to go. At full strength, each triangular infantry battalion was reinforced by a triangular machine gun company. Supporting artillery companies had the same triangular organization, and the same machine gun reinforcement.

As fast as they landed, Mahan's triangular units coalesced and moved forward as terrain, enemy fire, and the situation permitted. All units made full use of cover. Under ideal conditions, one unit was always moving forward, covered by fire from two others. When Mahan's main body landed behind the skirmishers, its companies or battalions advanced in the same kind of volley-covered rushes. Throughout the action, leaders down to the smallest unit were expected to use the maximum initiative. Even the individual rifleman must be able to select his own target, and adjust his fire to the ammunition at hand.

Here was radical doctrine indeed. Not only did it mean changing certain customary drills, it imposed a real burden on petty officers, and demanded men in the best physical condition who would display initiative.

In practice good tactical leaders had been using the Mahan doctrine for some time. At bottom, the difference between Mahan and Upton explains the wide edge generals like Lee, Jackson, Forrest, and Sherman held over so many of their Civil War contemporaries. Capt Mc-



An early amphibious landing: Marines and seamen, serving with Commodore Perry's squadron, storm ashore from pulling boats at Tabasco, in the Mexican War, 1846-48.

Lane Tilton must have stood with D. H. Mahan; for at Korea in 1871 he used Upton's doctrine to move his force into position, but turned the men loose when shooting started. Even Upton finally recognized the limitations of his *Tactics*. In the final letter of his life, he wrote the Army's Adjutant General in 1881, "In my effort to revise the tactics . . . I discovered that the double column and the deployment by numbers . . . was a failure. The fours, too. . ."

You might imagine, in the light of those facts, that anyone who expected to lead amphibious troops must stand up and cheer for D. H. Mahan. Yet none did.

If we may judge by discussion published in the Naval Institute *Proceedings*, no one accepted the proposed doctrine. LtCol H. S. Hawkins, Commandant at West Point, objected to its flexible nature. He held that infantry must advance in a rigidly controlled line. Ensign F. J. Haeseler, Ordnance Instructor at the Naval Academy, saw too little difference between Mahan and Upton to justify changing; nor could he conceive of any tactical movement not handled by the numbers. Lt L. W. V. Kennon, Sixth Infantry, USA, objected at great length. He balked at mutual fire cover by advancing infantry units; they might shoot into each other. And all of the objections were mild compared to those of Lt William F. Fullam, who thereby became spokesman of the sea-going line in its struggle for autonomy.

Fullam said that infantry tactics belonged to the Army. Besides, he considered D. H. Mahan's doctrine impractical because organizing "companies of 63 men would probably be very troublesome in many cases on board ship." And it was not merely impractical, but unsound

too; for it exaggerated the whole problem. Fullam insisted that "mob and street fighting . . . is that which naval battalions are most likely to perform. . . . We talk a great deal in the Navy about skirmishers and battles, but history shows . . . more cases of landing for service in the streets of cities."

The Bureau of Navigation stepped into the controversy right behind Fullam. In 1889, the Greer Board of Organization, Tactics, and Drills examined in detail the many proposals for adjusting ship administration to the realities of steam and great guns.

The problem was too big for immediate solution, so the Board's contribution is not entirely clear. It certainly killed D. H. Mahan's project for tying divisional organization to landing force needs, and clearly pointed to the big gun as the core of ship organization. The loudest recommendation called for moving all Marine units ashore. Fullam and his friends immediately pounced on that to justify eliminating the Corps as a naval unit. But Cmdr Henry Glass insisted that the Board had not advocated eliminating the Marine Corps. It intended, he said, to give the Navy a "compact, thoroughly drilled, and organized force to be used where landing parties were needed." In other words, Glass said the Board had amplified the Forney-Waller-Mahan proposal; it recommended making amphibious landing a Marine Corps specialty.

Like Mason in his first amphibious paper, the Board of Organization went too far. As we will see in the next article of this series, its recommendation did eventually lead to the Marine amphibious specialty; but without breaking the vital link between the fleet and its rifleman.

When the Board of Organization had disposed of amphibian recommendations for changing shipboard routine, BuNav reacted to D. H. Mahan's tactical doctrine. In 1891 the Chief of the Bureau issued an official manual, "Instructions for Infantry and Artillery, United States Navy." Curiously, Haeseler, Fullam and Kennon (D. H. Mahan's most vigorous critics) were prominent among its authors. Fullam had told Mahan rather sternly in 1888 that infantry tactics was no proper study for a Navy officer. Yet in 1891 (and again in 1894) he set up street riot formations to supplement the revised Upton on which the new manual leaned. Fullam insisted that a "simple drill book and a simple guard manual are needed

—that is all. Unnecessary complexity in these matters has been a great bugbear." And a simple drill book is exactly what the Navy got, without complexity of any kind.

Compilers of that first official amphibious manual obviously studied pioneer work of the preceding 12 years, but they hedged and compromised until the manual was scarcely a shadow of early doctrine. It proved a sound guide for organizing and moving large bodies of men — that is all. The original form is well preserved in today's *Landing Force Manual*, which Gen H. M. Smith, USMC, described in 1920 as already more than 30 years out of date.

The amphibious pioneers had worked both wisely and too well. Emotional fog generated by the incomplete chain of naval command still shrouds their great achievement. When command doctrine improved briefly during the short decade after 1894, a generation of Marines picked up the torch. And if D. H. Mahan followed the development of Marine infantry tactics, he was rewarded.

The same year BuNav issued its amphibious manual. Col Commandant Charles Heywood founded the School of Application at Marine Barracks, Washington; a step advocated five years earlier by Lt Waller. The basic manual used in its tactical training of Marine officers and non-coms was Mayne's *Infantry Fire Tactics*, a book summarizing the European development on which D. H. Mahan had based his work. Thus, three years after his revolutionary article appeared, the Marine Corps began a conscious effort to develop and expand the tactical system the youngest Mahan advocated.

Capt George F. Elliott used tactics like Mahan's at Guantanamo in 1898. The following year, at Novaleta in the Philippines, LtCol Elliott showed an outnumbered Marine battalion (that included Lt Smedley D. Butler) how to apply them against an entrenched enemy. Maj Gen Commandant Elliott ran the Corps while men who led the Marines in World War II learned those tactics in the field. The first clear triumph of the Mahan tactics over Fullam's came in 1914. Flexible, mobile and aggressive Marine units (like Maj Butler's battalion) moved steadily through sniper-infested Vera Cruz with few casualties. On their right, rigidly massed units of seamen suffered more heavily. Trained to fight in a hollow square because "history shows very few instances of real skirmishing [by] our naval forces," the bluejackets needed help from ships' guns to pass isolated positions that Marines had infiltrated.

Do you suppose Commodore D. H. Mahan, USN (Ret), ever compared the records of those two landing forces at Vera Cruz? If so, they told him that our Navy had taken the first big step toward its balanced amphibious force built around "a balanced force . . . of the United States Marine Corps."

To be continued



Airborne Assault From The Sea




By Sgt L. M. Ashman, Jr.

Recently HMX-1, the Marine Corps' experimental helicopter squadron based at Marine Corps Air Station, Quantico, Va., staged ship-to-shore exercises from the aircraft carrier USS SIBONEY, off Norfolk, Va. The exercise was designed to show how carrier-based helicopters can lift assault troops to take a shore objective by vertical envelopment. The accompanying photographs represent progressive stages, from reveille to deployment of troops, in this technique.



Roused from a sound sleep shortly before dawn . . the Marines eat a hot breakfast . .





while plane handlers fuel-up on the flight deck . . .



and spot the helicopters . . .



Meanwhile, a platoon sergeant checks his men . . .




before they take a stand-by position on the catwalk . . .



Then, "Launch helicopters" comes from the bull horn . . .



and the ships, with Marines aboard, rendezvous . . .




Nearby, a destroyer maintains a vigilant antisubmarine watch . . .



The pilots scramble for their helicopters . . .



and get the word to "board helicopters" . . .



Orders to the pilots: "Start engines" and "Engage rotors" . . .



before making a final pass over the carrier en route . . .



to the objective where Marines debark rapidly and deploy.

Passing in Review

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO MARINE READERS

Monumental Work . . .

LIFE'S PICTURE HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II—by Editors of Life and Time. 368 pages, indexed. New York: Simon & Schuster. \$10.00

One of the most monumental works on World War II came off the press five years and three months after that great conflict ended and not before another conflict had begun.

Although the words "picture history" are used in the title, the book also contains some 80,000 words of good, concise, factual prose highlighting the events of 1939-45. With less capable writers than John Dos Passos and Robert Sherrod, the text easily could have mounted to 150,000 words and not attained the same coverage. The text is easy to read, highly informative, and colorful in the Life-Time style.

The title, however, is not misleading. The book contains approximately 1,000 pictures selected from a group of 50,000. The pictures came from all branches of Armed Forces, free lance photographers, and allied and enemy sources. About 100 pictures and half that number of war paintings are printed for the first time.

Like icing which often makes a cake more palatable, the additional work on preface, epilogue, appendices, glossary, and index really complete the book as a history. The cost of total warfare, both in human lives and money, is set forth in the appendices. The glossary gives a thumbnail sketch of the war's leading personalities, friendly and enemy. Without the index it would be difficult to find any particular action which the reader prefers to give first attention.

Very little of the real meat of the book can be obtained by going completely through it, looking at the pictures, and reading captions. You can get a much more comprehensive view of the way by taking a chapter at a time, reading the text first and then referring to the pictures and captions. The book is divided into chapters, each representing a phase of the war. No one will be in complete agreement with this breakdown, or any other for that matter.

Life's Picture History of World War II is designed primarily for the civilian reader, but the military student can glean considerable insight into the strategic aspects of the war. The text on each phase briefly covers the major political and high-level military decisions that con-

tributed to success for one party and defeat for the other. At no place did I note anything of great tactical benefit for Marines below general rank.

Overall the book is a masterpiece in its class. Nowhere can you obtain such a collection of memory-stirring pictures tied together by straight-forward text. In addition the book is well-bound, attractive, and contains quality paper.

Taking everything into consideration, I could find only two objections to the book. It is a little heavy and unwieldy for the lap, and the darn thing wouldn't fit any shelf in my bookcases because of its 10"x14" dimensions.

Reviewed by Maj J. A. Pounds, III

East vs. West . . .

THE PRICE OF SURVIVAL—BrigGen Joseph B. Sweet USA(ret). 229 pages. Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Company \$2.85

BrigGen Sweet served as Commanding General of the Motor Transport Service of the Persian Gulf Command and as interim theater commander during World War II. Drawing from this experience and from information which he sought and obtained from highly qualified persons, he sets forth, in his book, his solution to the dilemma of our relations with the USSR. His facts and basic assumptions are logically organized and the problem is analyzed in the light of past events, the current situation, and possible future courses of history.

The mission of the United States is stated as being the attainment of national security, which is expressed as being, for Americans, "a state of freedom from danger of loss of essential liberties, resources, and opportunities. It is fundamentally a condition of justified national security, when considered from a mutual rather than an individual standpoint."

In evaluating comparative strength and weaknesses of the West and the Communists, both the "in-being" forces and the *potential*, based on manpower, industry and raw materials, are considered. This comparison brings out the fact that although we are now weaker, militarily speaking, the *potential* of the West is more than a match for that of Russia.

In examining the present situation, the author concludes that national security does not exist because there is a threat to our essential liberties, resources, and oppor-

tunities, and that positive action is required to achieve our mission. He further points out that the present cold war could become a shooting war either accidentally or by Russian determination. Russia, having the initiative, can select the time most suitable to her own ends, i.e., when she considers herself to be sufficiently strong but before we can gain enough strength to thwart her.

Finally, the author looks into the future. His vehicle in an hypothetical atomic age war and the conclusion here is that only an early and decisive victory can insure our national security. In a long war there could be no real victory for the terrible destruction would bring a burden of restoration which we could not carry again. Moreover, the author believes that the economies of all participants, possibly excepting our own, would be ruined, and our entire effort would be required to restore the devastated cities and the industrial stature of our own country.

The conclusions drawn are that we now lack the "in-being" forces to win an early victory if war should come, but that the Western nations do have the *potential* for sufficient strength to deter Russia from starting a war or, failing that, to win a swift victory. To gain that necessary strength our own armament program must be greatly accelerated. In addition, the West must integrate its manpower, resources, and raw materials into an efficient industrial and military organization with each country furnishing to the whole that which its strategic position and resources dictate. All these factors, however, are dependent on the most important single consideration, the factor of time. Every hour that passes is an hour lost by the West and an hour gained by Communism.

The Price of Survival presents a reasonable and well defined discussion of the problem and Gen Sweet ably supports his contentions. Whether the reader agrees entirely, partially, or not at all with the conclusions drawn, he will have gained a clearer and broader understanding of our relationship with the USSR.

Reviewed by Capt J. A. Apffel, Jr.

German Espionage . . .

OPERATION CICERO—L. C. Moyzisch. 209 pages. New York, N. Y.: Coward-McCann, Inc. \$2.75

Security in the British Embassy in Ankara during the latter part of World War II was such that an Albanian employed as valet was able to get his hands on material labelled "Most Secret." An amateur photographer of some skill, he filmed the documents, then sold them for fantastic sums to an attaché in the German Embassy designated as the go-between. Although promptly transmitted to people of import in the Nazi hierarchy, they either didn't believe the information to be authentic, or

didn't know what to do with it. At any rate, it appears the Allied effort was not damaged as a result of the leakage.

Mr Moyzisch was the German attaché, and thus no doubt has his facts straight. Trouble is there aren't enough of them to give a full fledged account of German espionage in Turkey, nor is the author's skill such as to make what he does have into an interesting little whodunit.

Franz von Papen has added a postscript to the book. Ostensibly his imprimatur, it is more like the kiss of death. He says Herr Moyzisch was unaware of the political and diplomatic business being transacted, and thus couldn't know how precisely it was intended to exploit any knowledge gained from Cicero. Von Papen should know; he was the German ambassador. He goes on to say that he may have something to say about all this himself on some future occasion. For those interested in espionage, particularly in Turkey, I recommend waiting for Von Papen to publish.

Reviewed by Capt J. M. Jefferson, Jr.

Propaganda in Action . . .

THE SOVIET IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES—Frederick C. Barghoorn. 297 pages, indexed. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. \$4.00

One of the main instruments of the Kremlin's aggressive foreign policy is Soviet propaganda against the United States. Building the world's greatest war machine, Moscow is seeking to turn world public opinion against the United States by accusing America of crimes against humanity of which it itself is guilty. Its handling of political warfare aspects of the Korean operation constitutes the latest and most intense phase of this ferocious hate campaign, points out author Barghoorn.

A study in distortion, *Soviet Image* gives an insight to the principal theme of the Soviet leaders, the "peace" campaign—which is intended both to deceive and to terrorize. Dr Barghoorn goes on to show how that theme deceives the gullible; terrorizes the war-weary who perceive that the Kremlin's olive branch thinly disguises the sword.

"How can the free world cope with this campaign of lies, threats, and pressure?" asks the author. First of all, by understanding its complex and sinister growth, by resolute reaffirmation of faith in the ideals of demo-

Marines everywhere are laughing over *Leatherhead*, the GAZETTE's cartoon book on life in boot camp. There has never been anything like it before. Turn to the inside back cover of this issue for complete details.

cratic citizenship and their embodiment in national and international policy.

From first-hand knowledge of these problems gained during more than four years' service in the American Embassy in Moscow and from scientific analysis of the continuing stream of Soviet propaganda, Dr Barghoorn supplies the materials for a fundamental understanding of the Kremlin's unremitting and utterly ruthless war against the West.

Reviewed by Cpl Lawrence M. Ashman

Arab Problems Reviewed . . .

MEMOIRS—King Abdullah of Transjordan. 269 Pages illustrated. New York; Philosophical Library \$3.75.

To readers of T. E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* the *Memoirs* of King Abdullah of Transjordan will serve not only as an interesting supplement but also furnish a brief although general sequel. It is readily apparent that few details can be included in such a short book covering as it does some 40-odd years of history. The interest of these *Memoirs* lies in the fact that they are written by an Arab leader who played a dominant role in the struggles of his people, and hence include in their content the broad outline of the Arab revolt which overthrew Turkish rule in the first World War. Aside from setting much of the scene of *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, it sparkles with passages which, by presenting the Arab side of an issue, contrast with Lawrence's remarks on the same issue. It is also interesting to note that Abdullah is one of the leaders considered by Lawrence in his search for the man with the spiritual force required to focus Arab sentiment in the Arab Revolt. Although respecting the qualities of Abdullah, Lawrence rejected him and supported Feisal, Abdullah's brother. Abdullah in turn reveals his disfavor with certain facets of Lawrence's personality.

The *Memoirs* deal primarily with the period 1915-1920 during which the yoke of Turkey was thrown over by the Arab peoples with British support. Prior to that period there is a cursory presentation of events and personalities leading to the revolt. There is an equally brief narration of events occurring between the world wars and the present post war period. The editor of this translation has taken pains to furnish footnotes, and notes at the end of several chapters, which elaborate and explain some of the events lightly touched upon by the King. Unfortunately the lack of maps forces the reader to orient himself with other sources.

The student of Middle East history will find little data of historical importance in this work. However the reader interested in a general picture of Arab problems will discover in King Abdullah's work a readily digestible presentation of a complex era.

Reviewed by LtCol V. J. Croizat

✓ Check List

About Marines

The Assault on Peleliu	Monograph Hq USMC	2.50
Battle for Tarawa	Monograph Hq USMC	1.50
Betio Beachhead	Marine Combat Corres.	2.50
Boot	Cpl Gilbert Bailey	2.50
Bougainville and the Northern Solomons		
	Monograph Hq USMC	2.00
Coral and Brass	Gen H. M. Smith	3.00
Defense of Wake	Monograph Hq USMC	1.25
Devil Birds	Capt John A. DeChant	4.00
Fix Bayonets	Col John W. Thomason, Jr	3.00
Follow Me	2d Marine Division Unit History	6.00
Guadalcanal Campaign	Monograph Hq USMC	4.25
The Fourth Marine Division	Unit History	5.00
Guadalcanal Diary	Richard Tregaskis	.25
History of the U. S. Marine Corps		
	Col Clyde H. Metcalf	5.50
Hit the Beach	Maj William C. McCahill	4.95
The Island (Guadalcanal)	Capt Herbert Merrillat	3.00
The Island War	Maj Frank O. Hough	5.00
The Landing Party Manual		3.50
The Long, the Short, and the Tall		
	Sgt Alvin M. Josephy	3.00
The Marine Corps Reader	Col Clyde H. Metcalf	3.00
Marines at Midway	Monograph Hq USMC	.50
The Ninth Marines	Unit History	5.00
The Old Breed: 1st Marine Division; George McMillan		6.50
On to Westward	Robert Sherrod	3.00
Saipan: The Beginning of the End		
	Monograph Hq USMC	3.25
Semper Fidelis, an Anthology; Marine Combat Corres.		3.50
Short History of the Marine Corps		1.00
(175th Anniversary Issue of Marine Corps Gazette)		
Sixth Marine Division	Unit History	5.00
The Spearhead: 5th Marine Division		
	Howard M. Conner	6.50
The Story of Wake Island	Col James P. S. Devereux	2.75
The Third Marine Division	Unit History	5.00
Uncommon Valor	Six Combat Corres.	3.00
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